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THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
CHANGE: A REVISIONIST HISTORY 
by 
Matthew Steilen* 
How do we change the Federal Constitution? Article V tells us that we can
amend the Constitution by calling a national convention to propose changes 
and then ratifying those proposals in state conventions. Conventions play this 
role because they represent the people in their sovereign capacity, as we learn 
when we read McCulloch v. Maryland. 
What is not often discussed is that Article V itself contains another mechanism 
for constitutional change. In fact, Article V permits both conventions and leg-
islatures to be used for amendment, and, as it happens, all but one of the 27
amendments to the Constitution have been made by legislatures. If conventions
alone represent the people in their sovereign capacity, then why don’t we actu-
ally use them to change the Federal Constitution? Are we to conclude that most
of the amendments are in some way defective? 
To show why Article V might have permitted the use of legislatures to amend 
the Constitution, this Article examines a series of political texts on the conven-
tion written between the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Writers in this
line defended the power of Parliament or the American colonial assemblies to
* University at Buffalo School of Law. Thanks to Guyora Binder, John Dugan, Brenner 
Fissell, Jim Gardner, Jonathan Gienapp, Michael Gilbert, Aziz Huq, Fred Konefsky, Julian Davis
Mortenson, Jessie Owley, Jeff Powell, Jack Schlegel, David Schwartz, and Barry Sullivan. Portions 
of this Article were presented at the 2019 Loyola Constitutional Law Colloquium, the 2018
Annual Meeting on Law and Society, the 2017 University of Wisconsin Discussion Group on
Constitutional Law, and the Buffalo summer law review workshop, and I thank participants for 
their comments. Finally, thanks to the law librarians at both Wisconsin and Buffalo for their
assistance in locating sources.
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2 LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24:1 
alter the frame of government. From their point of view, the people could be
present in the legislature, and when they were, the legislature could establish 
fundamental law. 
This perspective helps to explain the rightful place of constitutional change by
government. The people can be represented by the institutions of government, 
and when they are, those institutions can claim an authority to alter the Con-
stitution. In this sense, the popular sovereignty described in McCulloch is dy-
namic: it can be present in different institutions at different times. Presidents 
have repeatedly claimed just this authority. From the perspective of the writers 
examined here, the legislature could too. It was when corruption stopped up
legislative routes of popular constitutional change that the people could move
outside government entirely, to a convention, where they might alter the Con-
stitution to better secure their property and liberty.
The history set out here directly challenges the orthodox historical account, 
based largely on the work of Gordon Wood, that has dominated the legal acad-
emy for nearly 50 years. It focuses on the same key state—Pennsylvania—and 
argues in detail that Wood’s interpretation of the use of the convention there 
is incorrect. The Article emphasizes political context rather than ideology, and 
in so doing offers a more nuanced, and more realistic, view of the place of the 
convention in American constitutional change. 
Introduction ........................................................................................................ 3 
I.  The Orthodox View of the Constitutional Convention ............................. 7 
II.  The Convention in Seventeenth-Century England .................................. 11 
A. The Struggle over Popular Sovereignty Under the Stuarts and the
Commonwealth ................................................................................ 11 
1. Henry Parker’s Observations ...................................................... 13 
2. The Levellers’ Agreement............................................................ 15 
3. Isaac Pennington, The Fundamental Right, Safety and
Liberty of the People ................................................................. 16 
B. “Meere” Conventions, Constitutional Conventions, and Convention
Parliaments: Popular Sovereignty in the Glorious Revolution ............... 17 
III.  The Convention in Eighteenth-Century America ................................... 22 
A. The Colonial Assembly in Political Context ........................................ 24 
B. The Emergence of a Provincial Convention in Revolutionary
Pennsylvania .................................................................................... 27 
1. 1774–1775: The Politics of the Assembly and the Perceived
Need for a Provincial Convention  ............................................... 27 
2. 1776: The Assembly and the Provincial Convention Struggle
over the Independence Movement ................................................. 32 
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b. The Forester and Cassandra ................................................. 35 
c. An Ambiguous Alarm .......................................................... 37 
3. 1777–1787: Resistance to the Pennsylvania Constitution of 
1776 ......................................................................................... 39
IV. Amending the Federal Constitution: The Role of the Convention in 
Article V ................................................................................................. 40 
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INTRODUCTION 
How do we change the Federal Constitution? Article V tell us that we can 
change the Constitution by convention. A federal convention is called to propose 
changes, and those proposals become law when ratified by a sufficient number of 
state conventions.1 
Conventions play this role because they represent the people in their sovereign 
capacity. As Chief Justice John Marshall put it in McCulloch v. Maryland, it was in
conventions that the proposed Federal Constitution “was submitted to the people.”2 
Indeed, “assembling in Convention” was “the only manner in which they” could 
act “safely, effectively, and wisely, on such a subject.”3 A leading treatise on conven-
tions agrees, and extends the point to state constitutions. Under “the American sys-
tem of government,” the treatise states, it is “a special agency,” the “Constitutional
Convention,” that “frames our Constitutions” and “is charged with maturing the 
needed amendments.”4 
Constitutional conventions are often said to be an American invention, a by-
product of the movement to replace colonial charters with written constitutions in 
1 Article V states, in relevant part: 
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose 
Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds
of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either 
Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by
the Legislatures of three fourths of the several states, or by Conventions in three fourths
thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress. 
U.S. CONST. art. V.
2 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 403 (1819). 
3 Id.
4 JOHN ALEXANDER JAMESON, A TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS 1, 2 (4th
ed., Chicago, Callaghan & Co. 1887). 
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the early stages of the Revolutionary War.5 In the spring of 1776, as Pennsylvanians 
considered how best to frame a state constitution, a writer calling himself Demoph-
ilus urged that the danger of tyranny would be abated if “every article of the consti-
tution or sett of fundamental rules” governing “the supreme power of the state” were 
“formed by a convention of the delegates of the people, appointed for that express 
purpose.”6 Several years later, Thomas Jefferson also recommended a convention as 
“the proper remedy” “to fix” Virginia’s constitution and “amend its defects.”7 A 
convention, he thought, might be able to “bind up the several branches of govern-
ment by certain laws”—something the first state constitution had failed to do— 
while avoiding “an appeal to the people, or in other words a rebellion.”8 
The problem with this account is that we have not actually used conventions 
to amend the Constitution. Of its 27 amendments, none were proposed by a na-
tional convention.9 They all were proposed by Congress, as Article V also allows. 
Only one amendment, the Twenty-First, ending Prohibition, was approved by con-
ventions in three-fourths of the states.10 State legislatures ratified the rest in compli-
ance with Article V. In this sense, a good deal of our Constitution is not convention-
based. This includes its most important parts: The Bill of Rights rests on the merest
legislative authority. We have changed parts of the original Constitution (a docu-
ment ratified by conventions) by the votes of Congress and state legislatures.11 And
legislatures far outstrip conventions in the amending of state constitutions.12 One
5 E.g., Roger John Traynor, The Amending System of the United States Constitution, An
Historical and Legal Analysis 1 (1927) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California 
at Berkeley).
6 DEMOPHILUS, THE GENUINE PRINCIPLES OF THE ANCIENT SAXON, OR ENGLISH
CONSTITUTION 4 (Philadelphia, Robert Bell 1776).
7 THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 129 (William Peden ed., 1982) 
(1787). 
8 Id. Jefferson argued that the state legislature could actually amend the existing Virginia 
Constitution, since the Provincial Convention that adopted this constitution had acted as an 
informal legislative assembly. See id. at 121–22. 
9 The dearth is not for lack of trying. An older study found 356 state applications for an 
Article V Convention. Frank J. Souraf, The Political Potential of an Amending Convention, in THE
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION AS AN AMENDINGDEVICE 113, 114 (Kermit L. Hall et al. eds.,
1981); see also James Stasny, The Constitutional Convention Provision of Article V: Historical 
Perspective, 1 COOLEY L. REV. 73, 73–75 (1982). 
10 This is one of the amendments whose method of ratification is included in the text. U.S.
CONST. amend. XXI, § 3.
11 For example, Article II, Section 1, which describes the method of electing the President
and Vice President, was changed by the Twelfth Amendment and subsequently by the Twentieth
and Twenty-Fifth Amendments—all proposed and ratified by legislatures. U.S. CONST. art. II, §
1, amended by U.S. CONST. amends. XII, XX, XXV.
12 Ninety percent of the amendments to state constitutions between 1992 and 2000 were 
proposed by legislatures. Most states use referenda to ratify proposed amendments. Gerald















    
   
 
 
     
 
     
  
    
   
     
5 2020] CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 
senses a mismatch. If, as we learned in law school, the people are present in their 
sovereign capacity in the convention, then why have we used conventions only once
when formally amending the Federal Constitution—and then only to vindicate the
very sublunary right to drink?
What we lack is an account of the constitutional convention that explains why
they should be so rarely used for formal constitutional change. Existing scholarship 
largely declines to supply such an account. This is not a matter of describing partic-
ular “constitutional moments,” that is, extraordinary, creative episodes of “self-con-
scious acts of constitutional creation” in which the “spokesmen for the People re-
fused to follow the path for constitutional revision set out by their predecessors.”13 
The formal “path for constitutional revision” set out by the framers is precisely what
we want to understand. Nor is it a matter of explaining, on structural, institutional, 
or jurisprudential grounds, why most constitutional change occurs outside Article 
V.14 For what we want to know, at least in part, is something about Article V itself: 
why it should permit the use of both conventions and legislatures to formally amend 
the Constitution. 
This Article offers an historical account of the convention that answers these 
questions. The key theoretical idea in the account is that popular sovereignty is dy-
namic: it moves between institutions, both in and out of government. Building on 
an approach Keith Whittington has applied to the president,15 this Article describes 
how English and American politicians have competed for an authority to alter fun-
damental law by claiming to represent the people, and then have harnessed the po-
litical institutions they controlled to that end. Often this evolved into a contest be-
tween the authority of the legislature and that of an extra-legal, quasi-legislative
body, such as a convention.16 
Benjamin, Constitutional Amendment and Revision, in 3 STATE CONSTITUTIONS FOR THE 
TWENTY-FIRSTCENTURY: THE AGENDA OF STATE CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM 177, 181 (G. Alan
Tarr & Robert F. Williams eds., 2006). 
13 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 44 (1991). Ackerman draws on 
Gordon Wood’s account of the convention, which I will be criticizing here. See id. at 174–75, 
216. 
14 See, e.g., Richard Albert, Constitutional Disuse or Desuetude: The Case of Article V, 94 B.U.
L. REV. 1029, 1045–46 (2014); Aziz Z. Huq, The Function of Article V, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1165, 
1167 (2014); Jason Mazzone, Amending the Amendment Procedures of Article V, 13 DUKE J.
CONST. L.& PUB. POL’Y, 115, 117–18 (2018); David A. Strauss, The Irrelevance of Constitutional
Amendments, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1457, 1458 (2001). 
15 KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY: THE 
PRESIDENCY, THE SUPREME COURT, AND CONSTITUTIONAL LEADERSHIP INU.S.HISTORY 16–19 
(2007). 
16 See id. at 5 (“The judiciary is not the sole guardian of our constitutional inheritance, and 
interpretive authority under the Constitution has varied over time. At some points in American 
history, the Court has been able to make strong claims on its own behalf . . . . At other points,
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The time period under study runs from the mid-seventeenth to the late-eight-
eenth century, which might be described as the infancy of the constitutional con-
vention. Over this 150-year period, politicians and writers employed a number of 
different arguments to claim an authority to act on behalf of the people, but most
of these arguments can be reduced to what Zephyr Teachout has called “the anti-
corruption principle”: the norm that government ought to advance public interests 
rather than the private interests of those in power.17 Early American conventions 
functioned as a safety valve within this framework. If corruption stopped up gov-
ernmental mechanisms of popular constitutional change, the convention was avail-
able so as to avoid (as Jefferson put it) “an appeal to the people, or in other words a
rebellion.”18 Though conventions tended to pose greater risks for political elites than
legislative amendments, they posed fewer risks than armed rebellion. Of course,
conventions were also corruptible. Writers emphasized their informal proceedings 
and their indefinite powers, which seemed, inevitably, to expand. Worst of all, con-
ventions tended to be populated by the wrong men: radicals, zealots, and unprop-
ertied, dependent men, who were particularly susceptible to corruption. By empha-
sizing these defects, politicians in government struggled to reclaim popular authority 
from conventions. 
What follows  is an effort to ground this view of the convention in a set of  
historical texts. Part I sets out what I call the “orthodox” view of the convention,
drawing in particular on the scholarship of Gordon S. Wood and Richard Tuck.19 
Part II opens my case for an alternative, focusing on a strand of seventeenth-century 
English political writing about the convention and its relationship to Parliament in 
matters of royal succession and governmental change. Set in context, this writing 
reveals a dynamic struggle for the authority that flowed from a claim to represent
the people. Part III describes how this conception of the convention was adapted to 
an American context in which the legislative assembly traditionally enjoyed a claim 
to represent the King’s American subjects. I show how, in Pennsylvania, a Provincial 
Convention emerged as an alternative to a House of Assembly suspected of self-
dealing and excessive entanglement with imperial officials. Finally, Part IV draws 
on this account to interpret the framing and ratification of Article V with a goal of 
making sense of the respective roles it assigns the legislature and the convention. 
however, elected officials have strongly asserted their own authority to interpret constitutional 
meaning . . . .”).
17 Zephyr Teachout, The Anti-Corruption Principle, 94 CORNELL. L. REV. 341, 373–74
(2009); see also  LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC LOST 128–31 (2d ed. 2015). In this respect, one
could add Article V to the list of anti-corruption clauses Teachout identifies in the Constitution.
Teachout, supra, at 355. 
18 JEFFERSON, supra note 7, at 129.
19 See RICHARD TUCK, THE SLEEPING SOVEREIGN: THE INVENTION OF MODERN
DEMOCRACY 181–248 (2015); GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN
REPUBLIC, 1776–1787, at 306–43 (1998). 
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I. THE ORTHODOX VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONVENTION 
The account of the constitutional convention set out here is a revisionist ac-
count. It is not, strictly speaking, a “reply” to any particular author or piece of schol-
arship, but it is targeted, and in this Part, I describe the basic features of the view of 
the convention I intend to target. I call this view the “orthodox” view. Though we 
might connect the orthodox view to a number of different writers, here I focus on
two very influential intellectual historians: Gordon S. Wood and Richard Tuck. 
Both Wood and Tuck describe the eighteenth-century constitutional convention as
embodying the American people in their sovereign capacity, although their work 
differs somewhat in its methodology and sources.
Gordon Wood’s account of the American constitutional convention begins
with English practice, where he observes the expression’s ancient use in describing a 
variety of English assemblies, converging by the eighteenth century on “some sort 
of defective Parliament” whose representation of the nation was “imperfect” “be-
cause of the absence of the King.”20 Conventions, says Wood, were “[n]ot . . . nec-
essarily illegal,” since they were closely associated with a right to assemble and peti-
tion the legally constituted government to address the people’s grievances.21 This
frame allows Wood to group conventions with other “adjuncts” of government that
emerged in the mid-1760s in America, principally the associations and committees 
tasked with enforcing patriot boycotts of British goods.22 These bodies were all le-
gally deficient in the sense that they were not authorized by colonial charter, but 
they were, some men argued, nonetheless constitutional, because the people always 
possessed a right to assemble and present their grievances, and to provide for the 
protection of property when government failed to respect rights secured by charter
and the common law.23 
As one of these extra-legal, popular bodies, free from royal influence or corrup-
tion, conventions were suited to framing a people’s fundamental law in the form of 
a written constitution. Legislative assemblies could not claim the same status. Fo-
cusing on the case of Pennsylvania, where this view was expressed the most clearly,
Wood reasoned that “[i]t was the very historical and legal inferiority of a convention 
to a legislature that compelled the radicals to argue that a convention was ‘in a spe-
cial manner the epitome of the People,’ that, in fact, only a convention could make 
the people of Pennsylvania ‘a legal people.’”24 But the view was not unique to Penn-
20 WOOD, supra note 19, at 311. 
21 Id. at 312. 
22 Id.
23 Id. 
24 Id. at 337. 
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sylvania. The attitude eventually prevailed to such a degree that, wrote Wood, “gov-
ernments formed by other means actually seemed to have no constitution at all.”25 
At the center of the account is a neat connection between the legal deficiency of the 
convention and the privileged status it assumed in relation to the sovereign people. 
In this sense, Wood sees institutional boundaries working to clarify a theoretical dis-
tinction between fundamental and ordinary law rather than the other way around.26 
This puts the convention at the center of a story about the emergence of an Ameri-
can conception of fundamental law. 
Richard Tuck’s 2012 Seeley Lectures, collected and expanded in The Sleeping 
Sovereign, provide a theoretical grounding for the institutional role Wood assigns to 
the convention. Tuck argues that an important strand of modern political writing
distinguished sovereignty from government. 27 His principal example is Thomas
Hobbes, who argued in De Cive [On the Citizen] that (in Tuck’s formulation) a 
people could be sovereign without being “involved at all in the ordinary business of 
government” if they determined by majority vote “who should rule on its behalf and
how in general they should behave and then retire[d] into the shadows.”28 This view
is the source of what Tuck calls in his title “modern democracy,” insofar as modern
commercial states could not require the people to act in their sovereign capacity in
the administration of everyday government, as ancient theories of direct democracy 
are often described.29 Indeed, as we know from other studies, America’s “cosmopol-
itan” elites hoped the nation would become a leading commercial state in the At-
lantic world.30 It might not survive otherwise. Hobbes’s conception of democracy 
thus fit their purposes well, and Tuck maintains that it was this conception Ameri-
cans institutionalized when they distinguished conventions from legislative bodies, 
25 Id. at 342. 
26 See id. at 306–07; see also DAVID E. KYVIG, EXPLICIT AND AUTHENTIC ACTS: AMENDING
THE U.S. CONSTITUTION, 1776-1995, at 23–24 (1996). But see MARC W. KRUMAN, BETWEEN
AUTHORITY AND LIBERTY: STATE CONSTITUTION MAKING IN REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA 7, 32– 
33 (1997) (arguing that Americans distinguished fundamental and ordinary law from the 
beginning of the Revolution).
27 TUCK, supra note 19, at 249. 
28 Id. at ix–x. 
29 Id. at 6 (“The objection to ancient democracy in a modern state had always been presented 
as primarily logistical (so to speak), in that the citizens of a modern state could not physically 
gather together or could not find the time to do so. But implicit in this as an objection was the 
conviction that the gathering would be to discuss legislation.”); id. at 8. (“[O]nce it was recognised 
that . . . important acts of democratic sovereignty were by their very nature infrequent, the way
was open to recreate democracy in a modern setting . . . .”).
30 See, e.g., MAX M. EDLING, A REVOLUTION IN FAVOR OF GOVERNMENT: ORIGINS OF THE 
U.S. CONSTITUTION AND THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN STATE 3–5 (2003); Daniel J. 
Hulsebosch, A Discrete and Cosmopolitan Minority: The Loyalists, the Atlantic World, and the
Origins of Judicial Review, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 825, 825 (2006). 
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9 2020] CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 
reserving the special task of framing constitutions for popular conventions and pleb-
iscites.31 In this sense, American constitutions were “democratic” even if they did 
not involve the people in the ordinary, everyday business of government.32 
The orthodox view is not without support, but neither is it without cost, and 
as with all theories, one must try to get a sense of whether the price is worth paying. 
Some of the implications are striking. If, as Wood argues, it was widely believed by
the 1780s that “[o]nly ‘a Convention of Delegates chosen by the people for that 
express purpose and no other’ . . . could establish or alter a constitution” and that 
“governments formed by other means actually seemed to have no constitution at
all,” then we must conclude that the several states that did not employ conventions 
to frame their constitutions were regarded as not having constitutions, though some 
of these frames were retained for decades.33 And it would seem to follow that if “[n]o
legislative assembly, however representative,” could represent the whole people in 
their sovereign capacity, then any legislative alteration of a constitution would imply
a regime of legislative supremacy or legislative sovereignty, a status we ascribe to the 
modern British Parliament, which is said to enjoy a “right to make or unmake any 
law whatever.”34 In short, there is no fundamental law at all, in the sense of a body 
of law that binds government, if constitutions are not framed by bodies outside of 
government like the convention (or by a method even more popular, like the plebi-
scite). Apparently, we should regard the many governmental changes to our consti-
tutions as ultra vires. Indeed, legal scholars have already drawn this conclusion in
commentaries on Tuck’s work, describing judicial review as “popular sovereignty’s
frustration.”35 But judicial review is only the beginning of it, since constitutional
change occurs in every branch of government. 
Even more problematic—frightening, really—is the idea that the democratic 
credentials of the United States could consist in the meetings of a series of state
conventions held nearly 250 years ago, even if the people are now excluded from 
31 EDLING, supra note 30, at 107–09, 178–81, 183–93. 
32 See id. at 13, 23; see also  DANIEL LEE, POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY IN EARLY MODERN
CONSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT 312–15 (Martin Loughlin et al. eds., 2016). 
33 TUCK, supra note 19, at 197 & n.20, 213–15 (on the case of Rhode Island, whose charter
constitution lasted until 1842); WOOD, supra note 19, at 328, 342 (quoting the South Carolina 
legislature). 
34 A. V. DICEY&K.C., HON. D.C.L., INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE 
CONSTITUTION xviii (8th ed. 1915) (internal citations and quotations omitted); WOOD, supra 
note 19, at 328 (“No legislative assembly, however representative, seemed capable of satisfying the 
demands and grievances of large numbers of Americans. And it was this dissatisfaction and the
suspicion it engendered, as much as the idea of fundamental law, that explained the prominence 
that one kind of convention existing outside of the normal representative legislature gained in 
American thought.”). 
35 David Singh Grewal & Jedediah Purdy, The Original Theory of Constitutionalism, 127 
YALE L.J. 666, 683 (2018). 
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any hand in the government under which they live. Citing Jean Bodin, whom Tuck 
regards as an early proponent of the sovereignty/government distinction, Tuck ex-
plains that “it might be the case that on a day-to-day basis we [i.e., the sovereign 
people] are ordered around by a king or an assembly of some kind, and there may be 
no recourse to any other institution to protect us from those orders.”36 If this is meant
to describe the popular sovereignty for which American patriots revolted from the 
British empire, it is simply unrecognizable. Indeed, it bears far closer resemblance
to what the revolutionary elite called “slavery”: the absence of any control over one’s 
property or any security of personal liberty.37 The result, in short, is a perfect inver-
sion of American revolutionary thought. 
For purposes of clarity, then, we might summarize the orthodox view by the
following propositions: 
(1) No legislative assembly, however representative, can represent the
people in their sovereign capacity.
(2) Since legislatures cannot represent the people in this sense, legislative
framing or alteration of a constitution implies legislative supremacy or
legislative sovereignty, rather than popular sovereignty. 
(3) Conventions are necessary to give concrete effect to popular sover-
eignty and to create fundamental law, that is, law binding govern-
ment. 
(4) Constitutional change must occur by convention and plebiscite.
(5) The popular, “democratic” character of the new American govern-
ments consists in the fact that they framed their governments in a
convention and could possibly “awake” and reframe it.
A list of propositions cannot capture the complexity of either Wood or Tuck’s
account. But if the picture is a fair one, it should be clear the orthodox theory comes 
at a steep price indeed. It requires concessions that many will regard as non-nego-
tiable. Even scholars willing to compromise on everything, at least in principle, will 
demand the evidence justify it; and here the evidence is more mixed than the leading 
historical literature suggests. English and American writers have long maintained
that legislatures can alter constitutions if those bodies mount a persuasive claim to 
represent the interests of the whole people. It is for this reason that legislatures can
be included in Article V. 
36 TUCK, supra note 19, at 26–27 (emphasis added). 
37 See ALAN TAYLOR, AMERICAN REVOLUTIONS: A CONTINENTAL HISTORY, 1750–1804, at
91–119 (2016). 
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II. THE CONVENTION IN SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND 
What is the origin of the English constitutional convention as Americans of
the eighteenth century knew it? This Part makes a brief incursion into English pol-
itics and political writing in the seventeenth century when the two most important
conventions in modern English history occurred: the Convention of 1660 and the 
Convention Parliament of 1689. Both bodies handled issues of succession of power. 
To understand why conventions were employed to handle these issues and 
what their authority was in the minds of English politicians, we have to begin about 
50 years earlier, in the 1620s, with the struggle between the Stuart monarchs and 
Parliament’s common lawyers over what royalists called “sovereignty” and the law-
yers called “prerogative,” an authority or set of authorities to be used to promote the 
well-being of the nation.38 Common lawyers emphasized that Parliament stood for
the whole nation, so that if the King failed to discharge his duty to protect the peo-
ple, Parliament could do so on its own, whatever the King’s constitutional rights.39 
But turnabout is fair play, and years later, much the same argument was used against
the Long Parliament, which sat for over a decade beginning in the 1640s.40 Parlia-
ment, just like the monarch, might be corrupted by the private interests of elites and 
fail to promote the interests of the people.41 It was in these circumstances that the
sovereignty of the people had to be exercised by a temporary body outside of gov-
ernment entirely—such as the convention. 
I begin in Part II.A with a discussion of English writing about conventions 
under the Stuarts and the Commonwealth. Part II.B turns to English politics and 
political writing in the period of the Glorious Revolution. A reading of English
sources with which Americans were familiar shows, quite clearly, that the English
located popular sovereignty both inside and outside government, depending on 
whether government advanced the interests of the people. 
A. The Struggle over Popular Sovereignty Under the Stuarts and the Commonwealth 
To get a better sense of the dynamic quality of popular sovereignty, we should 
begin with the emergence of a doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty in seventeenth 
century England, for much that would later be said by Americans on behalf of the
38 See  FRANCIS D. WORMUTH, THE ROYAL PREROGATIVE 1603–1649, at 34–36, 54–59 
(1939). 
39 MARGARET ATWOOD JUDSON, THE CRISIS OF THE CONSTITUTION 279 (1949). 
40 EDMUND S. MORGAN, INVENTING THE PEOPLE: THE RISE OF POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY IN
ENGLAND AND AMERICA 80–81 (1988). 
41 See LEE, supra note 32, at 302 (“What is most striking is that even the House of Commons
itself—a body ostensibly assembled to represent the whole ‘commonaltie’ or ‘universality’ of the 
people . . . became . . . an object of suspicion as an anti-populist tool of elite manipulation and
exclusion.”). 
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people in convention was said then by Englishmen on behalf of the people in Par-
liament. The rowdy Parliaments of the 1620s were opposed to the King’s handling
of monopolies (exclusive royal privileges granted to particular subjects), religion,
and foreign policy—all matters traditionally regarded as within the prerogative of
the monarch.42 “Prerogative” was a fraught term, but here it refers to a domain of
policy-making in which the monarch was thought to enjoy a discretion unbounded
by ordinary law, subject only to the advice of his ministers and his own judgment 
about what would best promote the welfare of his subjects.43 Nevertheless, Parlia-
ment began to hear the “grievances” of the people on these matters.44 It staked its
claim to do so on grounds that it represented the whole nation, and that when the 
King’s government became corrupted and acted to promote the private interests of 
ministers and royal favorites, Parliament was obligated to protect the people’s wel-
fare and to secure their liberties under the ancient constitution.45 To this end, Par-
liament developed procedures (and extended or adapted some existing ones) to ac-
commodate deliberation on matters that had traditionally belonged to the King and
his council. Thus, according to one classic account, members used their control of 
committees to seize the “initiative” from the Crown in directing parliamentary pro-
ceedings, enabling them to investigate matters (like monopolies) the Crown did not 
want Parliament to discuss; and, having discovered crimes, members employed par-
liamentary judicature, quasi-legal proceedings like impeachment, to try royal favor-
ites for alleged crimes against the nation.46 The Committee of Grievances, in par-
ticular, seized for members of the parliamentary opposition (such as it was) the 
42 See, e.g., JUDSON, supra note 39, at 281–83; J.R. TANNER, ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL
CONFLICTS OF THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 1603–1689, at 47–67 (1971). 
43 JUDSON, supra note 39, at 23–34; WORMUTH, supra note 38, at 54–60. “Prerogative” in
this sense served as a kind of conceptual bridge between the Roman law principle that the prince 
was free from the law (legibus soluti) and the constitutional framework of the English common 
lawyers. 
44 COLIN G.C. TITE, IMPEACHMENT AND PARLIAMENTARY JUDICATURE IN EARLY STUART 
ENGLAND 83–114 (1974); STEPHEN D. WHITE, SIR EDWARD COKE AND “THE GRIEVANCES OF 
THE COMMONWEALTH,” 1621–1628, at 27–45 (1979). 
45 JUDSON, supra note 39, at 298–99. 
46 Elizabeth Read Foster, The Procedure of the House of Commons Against Patents and
Monopolies, 1621–1624, in CONFLICT IN STUART ENGLAND 57, 75–78 (William Appleton Aiken 
& Basil Duke Henning eds., 1960); see also WHITE, supra note 44, at 33–34, 142–83; Wallace 
Notestein, The Winning of the Initiative by the House of Commons (1924), reprinted in STUDIES IN
HISTORY: BRITISH ACADEMY LECTURES 145, 172, 177–78 (Lucy S. Sutherland ed., 1966). For a
recent appraisal of Notestein’s lecture, see ALAN CROMARTIE, THE CONSTITUTIONALIST
REVOLUTION: AN ESSAY ON THE HISTORY OF ENGLAND, 1450–1642, at 189–90 (Quentin 
Skinner & James Tully eds., 2006). A more critical assessment by a specialist in procedure can be 
found in Sheila Lambert, Procedure in the House of Commons in the Early Stuart Period, 95 ENG.
HIST. REV. 753, 757 (1980). 
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King’s traditional power to answer his subjects’ petitions.47 Thus, although it lacks
the élan of the constitutional convention, we should also count the legislative com-
mittee as giving the sovereignty of the English people an active, concrete form.
1. Henry Parker’s Observations 
English pamphleteers continued to describe Parliament in these terms during 
the Civil War and under the Commonwealth government that followed. Consider 
Henry Parker’s widely circulated defense in 1642 of (what we now call) parliamen-
tary sovereignty, Observations upon some of his Majesties late Answers and Expresses. 48 
Parker began by observing that it was “the people” who conferred authority on kings 
and that they did so with a particular purpose: preserving their own well-being.49 
“Salus Populi,” the welfare of the people, was the “Paramount Law” to which the 
King’s “Prerogative it selfe . . . is subservient.”50 On the same reasoning, Parliament
was “higher” even than the King, since the people were not “so properly the Author 
as the essence it selfe of Parliaments.”51 This connection naturally suited Parliament
to securing the people’s welfare, and consequently “publike safety and liberty could
not be so effectually provided for by Monarchs till Parliaments were constituted, for
the supplying of all defects in that Government.”52 Parliaments were also well con-
structed to avoid corruption. Since Parliaments comprised “the many eyes of so 
many choyce Gentlemen out of all parts,” they naturally acted to promote the “great 
interest . . . in common justice and tranquility,” rather than the private interests of
a few men; and the procedures employed in modern Parliaments made their delib-
47 MORGAN, supra note 40, at 224–26. As Morgan points out, the same argument could be 
directed against Parliament if it failed to remedy the grievances of the people. In this way, 
petitioning was an institutional means by which sovereignty could be forced out of government
entirely. Petitions allowed private petitioners to compete with their representatives for the claim 
to represent the people. 
48 HENRY PARKER, OBSERVATIONS UPON SOME OF HIS MAJESTIES LATE ANSWERS AND
EXPRESSES 1 (London 1642). On the relationship between the people and Parliament in Parker’s 
text, see LEE, supra note 32, at 294 (“Parliament, then, just is ‘the people,’ and ‘parliamentary 
sovereignty’ just is ‘popular sovereignty.’”); J. W. GOUGH, FUNDAMENTAL LAW IN ENGLISH
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 85–86 (Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1985) (1955) (similar); JUDSON, 
supra note 39, at 416 (similar). 
49 PARKER, supra note 48, at 1–2. As Parker puts it, the people are both the efficient and 
final causes of regal authority. Id. at 2. 
50 Id. at 3.
51 Id. at 5. As Parker frames it, because the community creates the King, and because 
quicquid efficit tale, est magis tale [whatever creates a thing of such kind, is more of that kind], it 
follows that the King is singulis Major, universis minor [greater than any individual person, but less
than the whole community]; while to the extent that the Kingdom is the essence and cause of 
Parliaments, the Kingdom is Parliament, since magis tale [est] ipsum quid quod efficit tale [anything
that creates a thing of such kind, is itself that kind]. Id. at 2, 5. 
52 Id. at 5. 
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erations “more vigorous” and “more orderly” than those of any other body, includ-
ing the “distracted and irregular” proceedings of other popular assemblies.53 So con-
stituted, Parker reasoned, Parliament gave “publike Councels,” in contrast to the
ministry’s “private advice,” which bent towards private interest.54 
But didn’t the King convene Parliament as his own court? If so, then what was 
Parliament’s constitutional status without the King? King Charles had recently fled
London; could the Parliament meet without his authorization and presence? By 
withdrawing himself, Parker conceded, the King “denies the assembly of the Lords 
and Commons . . . to be rightly named a Parliament,” legally rendering them “a
meere convention of so many private men.”55 Yet this “formalitie of Law” did not
deprive its members of all authority; if the King withdrew following the “ill Coun-
sail” of his ministers, so that “they might defeat this Parliament,” its members had 
a right to act to “sav[e] themselves and the whole state.”56 While in the “ordinary 
cases,” neither Parliament nor King could make a law without the consent of the 
other, “where this ordinary course cannot be taken for the preventing of publike 
mischiefes, any extraordinary course . . . may justly be taken and executed,” so that 
“the people may without disloyalty save themselves.”57 
In sum, Henry Parker’s Parliament stood for the whole nation; its purpose was 
to secure the welfare and liberties of that nation; its composition and formal proce-
dures suited it to this public purpose, more than any other governmental body. And
where corruption led the King to fail in his own obligation to secure the welfare and
liberties of the people, Parliament could act in his place and cure that defect. To be 
sure, as a matter of law, only the King could issue the writs to summon Parliament,
and his presence was necessary for it to do business.58 It was important to Parker
that the people act through a lawfully constituted Parliament, summoned by the 
King and conducted in accordance with proper procedure, in order to avoid “mob
rule” and to ensure the people “wielded” their sovereignty “in an orderly way.”59 
But this did not imply that if the King refused to call Parliament, dissolved it, or 
withdrew, Lords and Common were entirely powerless to act. They might act as a 
“convention.” 
53 Id. at 11, 13–14. 
54 Id. at 25–26, 30. 
55 Id. at 7 (second emphasis added). 
56 Id. at 7, 10. 
57 Id. at 16. 
58 Id. at 7. 
59 JUDSON, supra note 39, at 426 (describing Parker’s views). 
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2. The Levellers’ Agreement 
It was in the late 1640s, after the Long Parliament had sat for nearly a decade,
that English writers began to challenge the popular basis of its authority. The “Lev-
ellers” were an English faction that, among other things, proposed to reform Parlia-
ment to make it more representative of the nation.60 They collected their proposals 
in an Agreement Prepared for the People of England, which was to be submitted to
every English hundred (an ancient subdivision of a county) and ward (a subdivision 
of a city) so that all persons might voluntarily consent to it, thus providing the Eng-
lish people, in the words of historian Edmund S. Morgan, “a way of exercising their 
sovereignty outside Parliament and with a necessary superiority to Parliament.”61 In 
addition to immediately dissolving the Long Parliament (“many inconveniences,” 
said the authors, had arisen from “the long continuance of the same persons in su-
pream Authority”) and re-apportioning its seats, the Agreement prohibited any of-
ficer of the government from serving as a representative so that “no factions [could
be] made to mainetaine corrupt interests.”62 The newly constituted Parliament
would “have the Supreame trust in order to the preservation and Government of
the whole,” including the “erecting & abolishing of Courts of Justice, and publique
Offices” as well as passing laws and giving final judgment in all civil and criminal
cases.63 To ensure that it acted to promote truly public interests, Parliament would
be expressly prohibited from doing anything to “take away any [of] the Foundations 
of common Right, Liberty and Safety,” to “levell mens Estates, destroy Propriety, 
or make all things common,” or to promote religious factions by passing laws that
infringed on the right of conscience (excepting, of course, the unhappy Catholics).64 
The Levellers’ Agreement suggests that it was concerns about the representative-
ness of Parliament, about its corruption and failure to protect the people’s interests,
that led to a search for other institutions in which the people might assert their 
sovereignty. In 1648, the New Model Army, in which a number of Levellers served, 
purged the Commons of its Presbyterian members, a move that commanders justi-
fied by claiming that the army was now more representative of the nation as a whole 
60 LEE, supra note 32, at 299–300. 
61 MORGAN, supra note 40, at 68; see also JOHN RUSHWORTH, AN AGREEMENT PREPARED
FOR THE PEOPLE OF ENGLAND 18 (London 1648). 
62 RUSHWORTH, supra note 61, at 8, 16. 
63 Id. at 22. On the power to give judgment, the Agreement provided, “[t]hat the 
Representative may not give judgement upon any mans person or estate, where no Law hath before 
provided; save onely in calling to Accompt [account], and punishing publick Officers for abusing 
or failing their Trust.” Id. at 23. 
64 Id. at 24–25. 
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than Parliament.65 The remainder, the so-called “Rump” Parliament, sought to re-
establish Parliament’s claim to stand for the people.66 
3. Isaac Penington, The Fundamental Right, Safety and Liberty of the People  
Writing several years later, Isaac Penington, Jr., whose father had served in the 
Long Parliament, endorsed Parker’s view that the people were sovereign in Parlia-
ment, but now with several caveats.67 Of principal importance, Penington thought,
was that Parliament remain separate from the administration of government. “They
who are to govern by Laws should have little or no hand in making the Laws they 
are to govern by,” he wrote, since they would be likely to make laws benefiting 
themselves, as “Man respects himself in what he does.”68 In particular, Parliaments 
that sat for a long period of time were in danger of “contracting a particular Interest,” 
distinct from the public interest, and of seeking to advance that interest by “improper 
Work,” namely, “becoming Administrators in the present Government.”69 In the
end, long Parliaments would “swallow[] up the ordinary course of . . . speedy, free and 
impartial Justice by the administration and execution of the Laws.”70 The proper
work of a Parliament, then, was not administration, but “chusing, establishing or al-
tering Governments, Laws or Governors,” that is, “CONSTITUTIVE POWER” or 
“ALTERATIVE POWER.”71 Parliament was “an extraordinary, legislative, alterative,
corrective Power above the ordinary standing Power.”72 In this respect, it was essential
that Parliament “consist of the Body of the People” rather than the governors, as the 
people knew best where government was failing; Parliament should remedy its griev-
ances and dissolve before corruption could set in.73 If it continued, there would
eventually be need for a body “to stand between the people and them [i.e., Parlia-
ment],” just as Parliament had stood “between the people and Kingly Power”—a
body Penington might have called a “convention.”74 
65 On Pride’s Purge, see, e.g., MARK KISHLANSKY, A MONARCHY TRANSFORMED: BRITAIN 
1603–1714, at 184–85 (1996). On the popular authority of Parliament versus the army, see 
MORGAN, supra note 40, at 64–66, 74–75. 
66 MORGAN, supra note 40, 73–75. 
67 ISAAC PENINGTON, JR., THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT, SAFETY AND LIBERTY OF THE PEOPLE
2 (London, John Macock 1651). 
68 Id. at 3.
69 Id. at 11–12; see also id. at 17 (distinguishing “the Legislative Power” from “the
Administrative Power”). Penington was hardly unusual among writers of the period in endorsing 
a separation of the legislature and the administration. MORGAN, supra note 40, at 85 & n.17. 
70 PENINGTON, supra note 67, at 12. 
71 Id. at 4–5. 
72 Id. at 13. 
73 Id. at 6–7, 13. 
74 Id. at 13. Penington did not use the term “convention” in this context. 
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Among English politicians and writers who endorsed popular sovereignty, 
then, the location of sovereignty was contested and depended on whether an insti-
tution could persuasively be said to represent the whole English nation or, instead,
to advance only the private interests of a part or faction. Corruption formed the 
centerpiece of arguments for relocating popular sovereignty from one institution of 
government to another (from King and council to Parliament) and from within
government to institutions outside government (from Commons to the army or to
the people assembled in local communities). Parliament’s particular authority to es-
tablish or alter government was staked on an elision of legislative and extraordinary
power: making laws was not part of the ordinary administration of government, but 
a formal, orderly means by which the people could remedy or cure the defects of 
government. When Parliament itself began to exhibit those defects, however, it laid 
itself open to charges that another institution, one outside government entirely, bet-
ter possessed this extraordinary corrective power. 
B. “Meere” Conventions, Constitutional Conventions, and Convention Parliaments: 
Popular Sovereignty in the Glorious Revolution  
The dynamic quality of popular sovereignty evident in this period of English 
political writing exposes a basic ambiguity in the status of the convention.We might 
usefully distinguish what Henry Parker called “a meere convention” from a consti-
tutional convention. A mere convention is an assembly of Lords and Commons
without the King or one that was not called by the King’s writ.75 Its authority is a
product of necessity alone; absent a lawfully convened Parliament, a convention 
must do the Parliament’s proper business of constituting or altering government,
and sometimes even the work of government itself.76 In contrast, a constitutional
convention is an assembly whose authority to establish government is a result of the 
fact (if it is a fact) that it represents the people as a sovereign political community.77 
The constitutional convention may be formed alongside, or in place of, a lawfully
convened Parliament, although in that case it cannot be justified by necessity as the 
mere convention is.78 When one reads of English conventions in this period, one
must try to determine which of these senses is meant. The first sense of “convention” 
75 PARKER, supra note 48, at 7.
76 In this respect, the mere convention resembles what Jameson called the “Revolutionary 
Convention,” which he described as “dehors the law” and deriving “their powers, if justifiable, 
from necessity.” JAMESON, supra note 4, at 6. 
77 Id. at 2. 
78 This does not imply that the constitutional convention is necessarily illegal. As I use the 
term, an Article V convention would be both legal and a “constitutional convention.” Some 
constitutional conventions are legal, while some are mere conventions; and some mere 
conventions are not constitutional conventions. 
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is consistent with locating popular sovereignty in Parliament, while the second de-
nies the sovereign people are present there. 
Beginning in the 1650s we encounter English writers endorsing the idea that 
the people were present in their sovereign capacity only within a convention, alt-
hough it is not always clear and one must read carefully. For example, in the opening 
pages of Politica Sacra et Civilis, George Lawson maintained that “[i]f the Govern-
ment be dissolved, and the Communitie yet remains united, the People may make 
use of such an Assembly as a Parliament, to alter the former Government and consti-
tute a new.”79 That such an Assembly may be used only if government is dissolved
does suggest a mere convention. Lawson, a moderate Episcopalian minister, had 
sided with the parliamentarians during the Civil War, arguing that Parliament could
preserve the welfare of the people if the King declined to do so.80 On this basis we
might expect Lawson to endorse a parliamentary power to alter government. Yet
Lawson regarded government under the Rump Parliament as “a mere usurpation of 
authority” since it had been established by the army’s use of force.81 Parliament, 
properly understood, was an organ of government whose authority properly rested
on the people but which itself lacked what Lawson called “real majesty”—that is, 
the sovereignty that belonged to the people and in virtue of which they could estab-
lish government. Thus it was, Lawson argued, “above the Power of a Parliament” to 
alter government.82 The “Assembly” he proposed for that purpose was a constitu-
tional convention, that is, an assembly of the political community that possessed the 
sovereignty Parliament lacked. 
Lawson’s distinction between government, embodied by Parliament, and sover-
eignty, embodied by a special assembly, evokes the writing of several contemporaries. 
As Tuck has shown, Hobbes drew the same distinction several years earlier in De
Cive as did the politician (and briefly Massachusetts imperial governor) Sir Henry
Vane in his 1656 pamphlet, A Healing Question. 83 We can also find the distinction 
in the radical pamphlet literature published some 30 years later, around the time of
the Glorious Revolution.84 There, writers located the sovereignty of the people out-
side of government in a temporary, ad hoc assembly; governments in the modern 
79 GEORGE LAWSON, POLITICA SACRA & CIVILIS 35 (London 1660) (emphasis added).  
80 JULIANH. FRANKLIN, JOHN LOCKE AND THE THEORY OF SOVEREIGNTY 53–54 (1978). 
81 Id. at 55. 
82 LAWSON, supra note 79, at 35–36.  
83 See  TUCK, supra note 19, at 91–92. Vane proposed the use of a “General Council, or 
Convention of faithful, honest, and discerning men” to settle on a form of government to follow
the Protectorate. He described this Council or Convention as representing the people “in their 
highest state of Soveraignty . . . .” HENRY VANE, A HEALING QUESTION 20 (London 1656); see
also MORGAN, supra note 40, at 89–90. 
84 See, e.g., JOHN HUMFREY, ADVICE BEFORE IT BE TOO LATE: OR, A BREVIATE FOR THE 
CONVENTION 3 (London 1688) (“The Delivering us from Popery, is contained in the Setling our
Religion; and That being a Work of great length, is the business more properly of a Parliament; 
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world had to be conducted by the people’s representatives, and as one such organ of
ordinary government, Parliament lacked the authority to alter its own form. 
But this was one strand of thinking. The connection these writers drew be-
tween conventions and popular sovereignty was hardly a necessary one, and others 
rejected or even reversed it.85 As a general matter, pamphlet-writers exhibited less 
concern with elaborating a coherent theory than with how they could use ideas to 
frame or nudge what was politically possible.86 Politicians refused to concede that
Parliament lacked a power to alter or frame government; if these men supported the
use of a convention, then it was only the expedient “mere” convention. As Richard
Tuck acknowledges, Vane’s proposals for a constitutional convention “were not 
picked up” and the conventions of 1660 and 1689 simply “turned into regular Par-
liaments once the issues of the succession were dealt with.”87 
Conservative Whigs in particular insisted on Parliament’s power to alter gov-
ernment so as to preserve the power of the English nobility who sat in its House of
Lords.88 “For what,” asked one writer, “is the business of Parliaments but the alter-
ation, either by adding, or taking away, part of the Government, either in Church 
or State?” Indeed, he thought, “every Act of Parliament is an alteration.”89 Conven-
tions of men could not obviate this work. Only “God himself” could frame a gov-
but This is a thing must be done by the  Community, and consequently by those that are the 
Representatives of it, a Convention, so called, (in regard to a Higher Capacity hereunto) and not
a Parliament; for that represents the People, not as in a Community, but as in a Common-
wealth . . . .”); A BRIEF COLLECTION OF SOMEMEMORANDUMS: OR, THINGS HUMBLY OFFERED
TO THE CONSIDERATION OF THE MEMBERS OF THE GREAT CONVENTION, AND OF THE 
SUCCEEDING PARLIAMENT 7 (London 1689) (“To the Great Convention, which although it
consists of the same Lords . . . and of the same Commons . . . [as] in Parliament: Yet being the 
Representative of the whole Kingdom gathered together in an extraordinary case and manner, and 
for extraordinary ends, it seemeth to be something greater, and of greater power, than a
Parliament.”).
85 See NATHANIEL FIENNES, MONARCHY ASSERTED TO BE THE BEST, MOST ANTIENT, AND
LEGALL FORM OF GOVERNMENT 73 (London 1660) (contrasting “[a] Parliament” elected by
“Writs sent unto [the people] for the election of their representatives,” who “[carry] on the publick 
affairs of the Nation,” with “a convention of select Persons . . . unchosen by the people, to whom
all power was devolv’d, and who had even a right to have perpetuated themselves”). 
86 See  LOIS G. SCHWOERER, THE DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, 1689, at 161–62 (Johns 
Hopkins Univ. Press 1981) (1689) (“Like tracts printed at the time of the Exclusion Crisis, these 
tracts of 1688–89 sometimes combined illogically several theories.”); see also id. at 168 (observing
that the Convention of 1689 rejected many ideas in the radical pamphlet literature, in part due 
to “the political acuity of the members”). 
87 TUCK, supra 19, at 186–87. 
88 MORGAN, supra note 40, at 79. 
89 A LETTER FROM A PERSON OF QUALITY, TO HIS FRIEND IN THE COUNTRY 25 (London 
1675). 
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ernment that would remain unchanged by “Time, emergencie of Affairs, [or] varia-
tion of humane Things.”90 For Parliament to adequately exercise this power, argued
the earl of Shaftesbury in an address to the Lords, it was essential that “you keep 
your Station” and “maintain your rights.”91 The Lords’ guidance was crucial for
preserving order and preventing corruption, since the electorate were men “of a
mean and abject Fortune in the World,” “subject not only to disorders and quarrels,
but to be misguided . . . by their ignorance, and total want of that discerning fac-
ulty” and being “Corrupted and Seduced by the inveiglements of a little Mony, or 
a Pot of Ale.”92 A popular convention without Lords to check its proceedings would
inevitably slouch toward corruption.
Sentiments like these had enough traction so that when James II fled London 
in the winter of 1688, opening the way for Prince William, who had invaded Eng-
land at the head of a Dutch army, the lords mounting a provisional government 
were primarily concerned with how they could call a legal Parliament. 93 James had 
issued the necessary writs, but then cancelled them and burnt the undelivered ones, 
dropping the Great Seal of England in the Thames on his way out of town, so that
(he said) “[t]he meeting of a Parliament cannot be authorized.”94 The extravagance
was of little use if succession was thought to be the business of conventions. A young
90 Id. at 26; see also George Savile, Political Thoughts and Reflections, in  THE COMPLETE 
WORKS OF GEORGE SAVILE, FIRST MARQUESS OF HALIFAX 211 (Walter Raleigh ed., 1912) (“A 
Constitution cannot make itself; some body made it, not at once but at several times. . . . [A]nd 
without suiting itself to differing Times and Circumstances, it could not live.”). Halifax fashioned 
this point into an attack on the very idea of fundamental law, which he regarded as
“unintelligible.” Id. As we will see, Americans did not draw the same inference.
91 ANTHONY ASHLEY COOPER, EARL OF SHAFTESBURY, NOTES TAKEN IN SHORT-HAND OF
A SPEECH IN THE HOUSE OF LORDS ON THE DEBATES OF APPOINTING A DAY FOR HEARING DR.
SHIRLEY’S CAUSE 3 (London 1675). 
92 ANTHONY ASHLEY COOPER, EARL OF SHAFTESBURY, SOME OBSERVATIONS CONCERNING
THE REGULATING OF ELECTIONS FOR PARLIAMENT 11 (London 1689). To my knowledge it was
J.G.A. Pocock who first linked the series of texts cited in this paragraph, suggesting they were part
of an effort by Shaftesbury to scare country lords with the prospect of court rule under a standing 
army. J.G.A. Pocock, Machiavelli, Harrington, and English Political Ideologies in the Eighteenth
Century, 22 WM.&MARY Q. 549, 563–64 (1965). Edmund Morgan, in contrast, reads the texts 
as reflecting the embrace of a “cautious” popular sovereignty in which the people’s “betters”
retained an important constitutional role. MORGAN, supra note 40, at 104. 
93 See SCHWOERER, supra note 86, at 132–35. 
94 2 THE CORRESPONDENCE OF HENRY HYDE, EARL OF CLARENDON 226 n.* (Samuel
Weller Singer ed., London 1828); see also SCHWOERER, supra note 86, at 126. A leading proposal
was to treat James’s flight as ceding or abdicating the crown, authorizing William to act as a de 
facto monarch and thus to call a legal Parliament. William refused this course because it was 
inconsistent with the reasons he professed for invading England in his Declaration of Reasons. See
THE DECLARATION OF HIS HIGHNESWILLIAM HENRY 6–7 (Hague, Arnout Leers 1688) (calling
for a Parliament to be held to protect the protestant religion and rights of English subjects). 
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nobleman and close friend of John Locke95 did propose that the lords call a conven-
tion, but when members of the Convention Parliament met in early 1689, they
“showed none of the certainty” of the radical pamphleteers and theoretical writers 
about the precise nature of their authority in comparison to a Parliament.96 Was 
theirs a mere convention, or a constitutional convention? The situation was ambigu-
ous. Predictably, the Convention Parliament mimicked formal parliamentary pro-
cedures, leading Locke to complain that by employing such “slow methods,” aimed 
at “mending some faults piece meale,” they risked wasting an opportunity to “set up
a constitution that may be lasting for the security of civill rights and the liberty and
property of all subjects of the nation.”97 Yet it proved difficult for the Convention
Parliament to lay claim to such an expansive authority. Late into its proceedings,
leading Tories challenged its representative credentials. If the people were indeed
sovereign, observed Sir Robert Sawyer, then the Convention Parliament could not 
act on their behalf for half of its membership, the Lords, represented “their own
estate only,” and its Commons had been elected by but a fraction of England’s men,
women, and children.98 
By 1689, it was clear that a convention could be employed to establish or alter 
government. But Englishmen continued to assert that Parliament might do the
same, and the relative status of Parliament and convention simply depended on the 
circumstances. The advantages of Parliament were its composition, its formal pro-
ceedings, its possession of legislative power, and its traditional role in answering
grievances and providing extraordinary remedies. The advantages of a convention 
were that it offered a more representative apportionment, the absence of the King
(and his veto), and the absence of corruption, private interests, and faction. But the
balance of advantage could be contested. While a convention might be framed as 
expressing the sovereignty of the people, so might a Parliament: the matter was up
for dispute. Sovereignty was dynamic. 
95 The nobleman was Thomas Herbert, earl of Pembroke. SCHWOERER, supra note 86, at 
135. 
96 MORGAN, supra note 40, at 110. It should be noted as well that alongside contemporary 
writings of radical Whigs, parliamentarian tracts of the Civil War era, including those by Henry
Parker, were republished and circulated. SCHWOERER, supra note 86, at 155. 
97 Letter from John Locke (Jan. 1689), reprinted in TUCK, supra note 19, at 184–85; see also
SCHWOERER, supra note 86, at 171 (“The assembly was, strictly speaking, an illegal body, but
efforts to preserve legal forms were made.”). Carefully read, Locke’s letter does not imply that
Parliament was incapable of establishing a government, only that its procedures were unsuited to
the task. 
98 SCHWOERER, supra note 86, at 179. The point, it  should be noted, invited an angry 
rebuke. Id.; see also Lois G. Schwoerer, A Jornall of the Convention at Westminster Begun the 22 of
January 1688/9, 49 BULL. INST. HIST. RES. 242, 252 (1976). 




   







   











   
  
 
22 LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24:1 
III. THE CONVENTION IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA  
Americans held conventions from an early date. As early as 1689, they de-
scribed meetings of the colonial legislature without the governor or council as “con-
ventions,” a usage and timing suggestive of the influence of the contemporary Con-
vention Parliament.99 We can find evidence of a similar influence nearly a hundred
years later. Most of the state constitutions formed in 1776 and 1777 were framed 
and enacted by bodies called conventions.100 Among these bodies, however, there
were significant differences. The Provincial Convention that framed and adopted 
the Virginia Constitution, for example, was primarily a revolutionary assembly,
combining (what we would call) legislative, executive, and judicial powers; and the
great planters of Virginia, who composed its members, framed a constitution with-
out any “express authority from the people.”101 Voters in New York chose men for
its “Provincial Congress” for the express purpose of framing and adopting a consti-
tution;102 upon convening, the body duly changed its name to “Provincial Conven-
tion” and enacted a constitution, though it also engaged in some wartime govern-
ance.103 Other states employed both a convention and the legislature to frame a 
constitution, and some used only the legislature.104 In Connecticut, for example,
99 J. Franklin Jameson, The Early Political Uses of the Word Convention, 3 AM. HIST. REV. 
477, 478 (1898). 
100 See, e.g., WILLI PAUL ADAMS, THE FIRST AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS: REPUBLICAN 
IDEOLOGY AND THE MAKING OF THE STATE CONSTITUTIONS IN THE REVOLUTIONARY ERA 64– 
90 (Rita Kimber & Robert Kimber trans., 2001); WALTER FAIRLEIGH DODD, THE REVISION AND 
AMENDMENT OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS 3–25 (1910); JAMESON, supra note 4, at 119–45;
KRUMAN, supra note 26, at 15–33; KYVIG, supra note 26, at 23–30. 
101 DODD, supra note 100, at 24. Like Virginia, South Carolina and New Jersey adopted 
their first state constitutions in a revolutionary assembly, usually described as a “provincial
congress.” E.g., ADAMS, supra note 100, at 68–72. In short, in all three colonies (South Carolina, 
New Jersey, and Virginia), the same body (1) framed a constitution, (2) adopted the constitution, 
and (3) conducted revolutionary governance. 
102 1 JOURNALS OF THE PROVINCIAL CONGRESS, PROVINCIAL CONVENTION, COMMITTEE
OF SAFETY AND COUNCIL OF SAFETY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, 1775–1776–1777, at 838, 
856, 866 (Albany, Thurlow Weed 1842). 
103 The Convention met for about another month and handled a variety of matters related 
to the war effort. Id.; see also JAMESON, supra note 4, at 138 & n.2. In contrast, the national
Continental Congress kept the name “Congress,” though some delegates regarded it as analogous 
to the English Convention Parliament of 1689. See  JERRILYN GREENE MARSTON, KING AND
CONGRESS: THE TRANSFER OF POLITICAL LEGITIMACY, 1774–1776, at 81 (1987). 
104 Colonies whose legislatures framed or adopted a state constitution were South Carolina 
(the second constitution), Connecticut, and Rhode Island. Although Massachusetts is most often 
associated with the framing of a constitution by convention and ratification by popular vote, its 
first proposed constitution was framed by a convention consisting of the two houses of the 
legislature sitting together. KRUMAN, supra note 26, at 16, 30–32. As we will see below,
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the legislative assembly merely reauthorized the colonial charter, thereby giving it
popular sanction.105 As the jurist Roger Traynor observed in his doctoral disserta-
tion on this subject, Americans’ “[n]otions of fundamental law, contract theories, 
and beliefs that ‘the constitution in a free state is fix’d’” did not prevent them from
making such changes as they themselves felt necessary,” for which they sometimes 
used “their legislative bodies.”106 
The variety of purposes to which “conventions” were put makes it difficult to
attribute a particular significance to their use. I try to get a handle on this question 
by approaching it politically, rather than institutionally. Although, as Marc Kruman
has forcefully argued, Americans readily distinguished constitutions from ordinary 
legislation, they did not readily distinguish the authority of the assembly to frame a
constitution from that of a convention; and the precise authority an assembly could 
claim over a constitution depended on provincial politics and political culture.107 
This does not imply that whether a state decided to call a convention to frame a 
constitution was merely a matter of “ordinary politics.”108 Instead, the meaning that
political conflict took on and the justification it was understood to offer for holding 
a convention (or not) grew out of received ideas about corruption and popular sov-
ereignty that will be familiar to us from our study of English political writing. 
I develop this position in the following two sections. First, in Part III.A, I argue 
that the elites who emerged to lead the Revolution had filled the lower houses of 
colonial legislatures for decades before 1776. These men lay outside the metropoli-
tan power structure but dominated provincial political bodies.109 From this perspec-
tive, an imperial policy that displaced the colonial assembly appeared to threaten the 
“privilege” elites enjoyed, under their charters, to tax themselves. This cast the as-
sembly as representing the American people. 
Second, in Part III.B I study the call for a constitutional convention in Penn-
sylvania, on which Gordon Wood focused much of his attention. In most colonies, 
the chartered legislature could not convene in 1775 and 1776, and these colonies 
had to resort to a convention as a matter of necessity. Thus these bodies were what
I have called “mere” conventions. It was only in colonies, whose charter assemblies 
Pennsylvania’s lower house, the Assembly, also proposed to host a convention for framing a state
constitution. 
105 The Connecticut Charter, like the Rhode Island Charter, permitted freemen of the 
colony to elect a governor. ADAMS, supra note 100, at 64. 
106 Traynor, supra note 5, at 32–33. 
107 See KRUMAN, supra note 26, at 32–33 (arguing that the use of a convention depended on 
“the kind of government in place during the revolutionary crisis”). 
108 G. ALAN TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 57 (1998). The view that first 
state constitutions were the product of “ordinary politics” rather than deliberation or political
theory is associated with Alan Tarr. Id. at 57–58. 
109 MICHAL JAN ROZBICKI, CULTURE AND LIBERTY IN THE AGE OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION 56–64 (2011). 
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continued to meet, that a case for a constitutional convention had to be made. This 
case revolved around the same themes that characterized conflicts over popular sov-
ereignty in seventeenth-century England: corruption and representativeness. Thus,
when concerns were expressed that framers might engage in self-dealing or consti-
tutionalize the private interests of a powerful faction, rather than the public good, 
men tended to emphasize the distinction between a charter assembly and a conven-
tion.
It is relatively easy to produce endorsements of the constitutional convention 
from leading Americans. But to understand these endorsements—to understand the
scope of their defense of the convention—we have to put them in context. Was a 
convention being advocated out of necessity? Was it being advocated, instead, be-
cause of some kind of perceived defect in the legislative assembly? And if there was 
a defect, what was it? Might it be cured, or did the author intend to deny that a 
legislative assembly could ever express the will of the sovereign people? For example,
in response to a letter from the Provincial Convention of Massachusetts in June of 
1775, “setting forth the difficulties they labour under, for want of a regular form of
Government,” John Adams suggested that “Congress ought now to recommend to
the People of every Colony to call such Conventions immediately and set up Gov-
ernments of their own,” offering what appears to be a broad endorsement of the use
of conventions; yet when the resolution he drafted and fought for was finally issued 
a year later, recommending to the colonies that they frame new governments, it gave 
that task to “assemblies and conventions,” dropping, perhaps, assumptions that had
applied in particular to the state of affairs in Massachusetts. 110 
A. The Colonial Assembly in Political Context 
To understand how Americans received and employed English distinctions, 
one has to begin with the place of the lower house of the colonial legislature in the 
political life of the colony. Assemblies were especially important to American elites,
who spoke of the “privileges” they enjoyed by governing themselves there.111 Most
important, of course, was the control that lower houses exerted over the purse, which 
they used with great effect to check the ambitions of imperial governors and the 
allies.112 Elites substantiated their claim to represent the people of their colony by
110 3 DIARY AND AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF JOHN ADAMS 351–52 (L.H. Butterfield ed., 1961)
(response to June 1775 letter from the Provincial Convention in Massachusetts); 4 JOURNALS OF
THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774–1789, at 342, 357–58 (Worthington Chauncey Ford ed.,
1906) (1776) (emphasis added) (final resolution and preamble). On the uncertainty of Adams’s
views, see DODD, supra note 100, at 26 n.61. 
111 ROZBICKI, supra note 109, at 115–16, 143–44. 
112 JACK P. GREENE, THE QUEST FOR POWER: THE LOWER HOUSES OF ASSEMBLY IN THE 
SOUTHERN ROYAL COLONIES 1689–1776, at 49 (1963); Christine A. Desan, The Constitutional
Commitment to Legislative Adjudication in the Early American Tradition, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1381, 
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hearing petitions and redressing grievances—legislative functions that had served a
similar role in the decades preceding the English Civil War, as discussed above.113 
When, during the imperial crisis that began in the mid-1760s, American pamphlet-
eers wrote about the need to bring security to liberty and property, it was this legis-
lative privilege they had most in mind: the privilege to decide when to grant money
to the Crown by an act of the colonial assembly.114 
From this perspective, American patriots were actually at odds with positions 
English parliamentarians had earlier staked out in their own struggles with the King. 
Although English writers had asserted that Parliament possessed an exclusive power
to grant the King supply (taxation), American assemblies now sought to retain for 
themselves the right to grant the property of American subjects.115 And while Par-
liament had asserted an authority to investigate the abuse of special privileges
granted by the King and to dissolve those privileges when Commons judged it to be 
in the public interest, Americans asserted that the privilege of convening in their 
assembly, granted to colonists by the King’s charter, was indefeasible and immune
from parliamentary interference.116 Parliament’s powers over taxation and grievance
thus significantly overlapped with privileges claimed by colonial elites for their own 
assemblies. Until the imperial crisis began in earnest in the 1760s, however, no one 
1391 (1998); see  JOSH CHAFETZ, CONGRESS’S CONSTITUTION: LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY AND
THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 45–77, 92–93 (2017). 
113 On petitions in American colonial assemblies, see MORGAN, supra note 40, at 223–30; 
Maggie McKinley, Petitioning and the Making of the Administrative State, 127 YALE L.J. 1538,
1558–59 (2018). 
114 See JACK P. GREENE, THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 
73–76 (2011); JOHN PHILLIP REID, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
4, 8–9, 15–20, 33–39 (abr. ed. 1995). 
115 See, e.g., Debate on Mr. Burke’s Resolutions for Conciliation with America, in 1 AMERICAN
ARCHIVES, FOURTH SERIES 1745, 1776 n.* (Peter Force ed., Washington, M. St. Clair Clarke & 
Peter Force 1837) (“[I]t was denied that the American Assemblies ever had a legal power of
granting a revenue to the Crown. This they insisted to be the privilege of Parliament only; and a
privilege which could not be communicated to any other body whatsoever. In support of this 
doctrine, they quoted the following clause from that palladium of the English Constitution, and 
of the rights and liberties of the subject, commonly called, the Bill, or Declaration, of 
Rights . . . .”); see also  REID, supra note 114, at 26, 35–36 (describing the British metropolitan 
perspective on taxation); Barbara A. Black, The Constitution of Empire: The Case for the Colonists, 
124 U. PA. L. REV. 1157, 1200 (1976). 
116 Bill for the Better Regulating the Government of the Province of Massachusetts Bay, in 1 
AMERICAN ARCHIVES, supra note 115, at 71 (Speech of Welbore Ellis) (stating that “chartered 
rights are by no means those sacred things which never can or ought to be altered,” and that they
might be altered “if the Supreme Legislature find [them] . . . unfit and inconvenient”); see also 
CHARLES HOWARD MCILWAIN, THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: A CONSTITUTIONAL 
INTERPRETATION 179–85 (1923); Matthew Steilen, How to Think Constitutionally About
Prerogative: A Study of Early American Usage, 66 BUFF. L. REV. 557, 571–72, 588–91 (2018); 
Traynor, supra note 5, at 5–13, 22, 33. 




















   









26 LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24:1 
had resolved the priority of these competing jurisdictional claims.117 One imperial
administrator who saw the conflict described the constitution of the British empire
as “dangerously uncertain.”118 
Americans also had experience “out of doors,” in informal associations operat-
ing outside of legal government. As we have seen, there was a dynamic quality to 
popular sovereignty in English politics, and American politicians in and out of gov-
ernment also competed with one another by asserting that the institutions they con-
trolled were more representative of the people.119 A number of colonies possessed
long-standing traditions of popular action by so-called “regulators” and mobs, and
colonial elites sometimes sought to co-opt these groups or to lead them person-
ally.120 The “associations” and committees that arose in the early stages of the Rev-
olution advanced the same claims to justify their actions: they sought to bring secu-
rity to the liberty and property of Americans against parliamentary and ministerial
oppression.121 The question raised in each colony was the relative constitutional
status of these bodies and the assemblies authorized by the colony charter. Where a
royal governor dissolved the colonial assembly or fled the state (as Governor Tryon 
of New York and Lord Dunmore of Virginia did early in the conflict),122 colonial
elites could persuasively argue that it was necessary for the defense of liberty and 
property to form a convention, since it was legally impossible to convene the assem-
bly.123 Thus, what I have called “mere conventions” were employed in New York
and Virginia to frame constitutions in 1776 and 1777.124 Americans could point to
English precedent in support of these institutions.125 
But these popular bodies were generally regarded as extraconstitutional and had 
to justify their claims to authority. Assemblies, in contrast, had a firm constitutional 
117 See MORGAN, supra note 40, at 140–48, 237–38, 243–44. 
118 See  THOMAS POWNALL, THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE COLONIES 45–46 (4th ed. 
London 1768). 
119 See MORGAN, supra note 40, at 134–40. 
120 See, e.g., TAYLOR, supra note 37, at 38, 70–71. In Pennsylvania, a prominent example of 
a colonial elite leading radical informal popular groups was Thomas McKean. After heading 
various informal committees during the Revolution, McKean became the state’s first chief justice. 
See ROBERDEAU BUCHANAN, LIFE OF THE HON. THOMAS MCKEAN 18, 54 (Lancaster, Inquirer 
Printing Co. 1890). 
121 T.H. BREEN, AMERICAN INSURGENTS, AMERICAN PATRIOTS: THE REVOLUTION OF THE
PEOPLE 162, 204 (2010). 
122 CHARLES RAMSDELL LINGLEY, THE TRANSITION IN VIRGINIA FROM COLONY TO
COMMONWEALTH 158–59 (1910); BERNARD MASON, THE ROAD TO INDEPENDENCE: THE 
REVOLUTIONARYMOVEMENT IN NEW YORK, 1773–1777, at 213–49 (1966). 
123 See, e.g., JEFFERSON, supra note 7, at 121 (describing the basis for forming a Virginia 
Convention). 
124 For accounts of these conventions in New York and Virginia, see, for example, LINGLEY,
supra note 122, at 137–77; MASON, supra note 122, at 213–49.  
125 See supra Part I.
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basis in the provincial political mind and a long history of advocating on behalf of 
American subjects against imperial power. This was the baseline against which pop-
ular conventions’ claims to authority would be measured.
B. The Emergence of a Provincial Convention in Revolutionary Pennsylvania 
The next three sections describe the relationship between the provincial As-
sembly and Convention in Pennsylvania at the opening of the war. In contrast to 
New York and Virginia, events in Pennsylvania did pose the question of whether a 
“constitutional convention” was necessary to frame a new government. The colony’s 
Charter of 1701 obligated the Assembly to convene yearly in October, although the
Governor did possess a power to call special sessions.126 The Assembly also con-
trolled how long it sat, since the Governor was denied a power to adjourn, dissolve
or prorogue it, as royal governors did in other colonies.127 As we will see, it was the
representativeness and corruption of the Assembly that became the basis of claims 
that a Provincial Convention should be held to frame a new state constitution. In
response, defenders of the Assembly characterized the popular committees calling 
for a convention as unrepresentative and mob-like and emphasized that it was the 
Assembly’s constitutional authority to redress the grievances of the people. Thus,
we see the principal themes of English political writing about Parliaments and Con-
ventions and the authority to alter the frame of government. 
1. 1774–1775: The Politics of the Assembly and the Perceived Need for a 
Provincial Convention 
When news arrived in May 1774 of the passage of the Coercive Acts, which 
closed the port of Boston in retribution for the Tea Party, the Pennsylvania Assem-
bly had adjourned and was not in session.128 At first, Governor John Penn declined
to call a special session, but when he observed the success of Philadelphia radicals in
gathering support for a “Provincial Convention” to select delegates to the proposed 
Continental Congress, he summoned the Assembly on the pretext of responding to
126 JOAN DE LOURDES LEONARD, THE ORGANIZATION AND PROCEDURE OF THE 
PENNSYLVANIA ASSEMBLY, 1682–1776, at 9–10 (1949), reprinted from 72 PA.MAG.HIST.&BIO. 
215 (1948); William Penn, Charter of Privileges Granted by William Penn, Esq; to the Inhabitants
of Pennsylvania and Territories, in A COLLECTION OF CHARTERS AND OTHER PUBLICK ACTS 
RELATING TO THE PROVINCE OF PENNSYLVANIA 42, 43 (Philadelphia, B. Franklin 1740) (“For the
well governing of this Province and Territories, there shall be an Assembly yearly chosen, by the 
Freemen thereof, to consist of Four Persons out of each County, of most Note for Virtue, Wisdom 
and Ability, (or of a greater Number at any Time, as the Governor and Assembly shall agree) upon 
the First Day of October forever . . . .”).
127 LEONARD, supra note 126, at 8. 
128 See J. PAUL SELSAM, THE PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTION OF 1776: A STUDY IN
REVOLUTIONARY DEMOCRACY 50–55 (1936); THEODORE THAYER, PENNSYLVANIA POLITICS
AND THE GROWTH OF DEMOCRACY 1740–1775, at 155–57 (1953).  
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Indian warfare in the western counties.129 As a result, it was in Pennsylvania, and
Pennsylvania alone, that the colonial Assembly met at the same time as successive 
Provincial Conventions.130 This brought the Assembly and Convention into open
competition for control over the movement to resist British imperial policy. In stak-
ing out its ground, the Convention could not easily avail itself of an argument from 
necessity, since the Assembly continued to meet and the government continued to
function.
In the early stages of this conflict, the crucial distinction between the two bod-
ies was political rather than constitutional. The Assembly was dominated by con-
servative and moderate Quakers.131 At the time of the Coercive Acts, Quakers and
their allies held over one-half of the seats, despite constituting only one-tenth of the 
colony’s population, and most of these lawmakers were “veterans” of multiple ses-
sions.132 Part of the reason for their dominance was the malapportionment of seats 
in the Assembly: The three eastern counties on the Delaware River elected twenty-
four of the forty seats and Philadelphia elected two, but the western counties elected
only fourteen.133 Lancaster County, for example, had the same population of Phil-
adelphia County but only half its representation.134 Over the course of the eight-
eenth century, malapportionment had become a deliberate policy in the Assem-
bly.135 The Quaker party had sought to entrench itself against the Scotch-Irish
Presbyterians settling on the western frontier. As a leading study puts it, “the 
Friends’ fear of a Presbyterian challenge to many decades of tolerant, pacific Quaker 
government grew from a concern in the 1730s and 1740s to an obsession in the 
1750s and 1760s,” transforming the party into “a narrowly partisan faction.”136 In 
the 1760s, a Quaker-controlled Assembly even sought to use its power to convert
Pennsylvania from a proprietary to a royal colony, in defiance of the Scotch-Irish, 
whose experience in Ireland had left them with a distrust of royal government.137 
The Assembly forwarded a petition to the colony’s agent in London advocating the 
change, but the speaker, himself a moderate Quaker, doubted whether the Assembly 
129 THAYER, supra note 128, at 158. 
130 RICHARD ALAN RYERSON, THE REVOLUTION HAS NOW BEGUN: THE RADICAL
COMMITTEES OF PHILADELPHIA, 1765–1776, at 53 (1978). 
131 See id. at 8–11. 
132 Id. at 10, 13–14 (analysis of the denominational status of Pennsylvania assemblymen in 
1773–1774). 
133 Id. at 12. 
134 Id. at 12–13. 
135 Id. at 7–8, 10, 12–13. 
136 Id. at 17. 
137 THAYER, supra note 128, at 94. 





























     
    
   
  
292020] CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 
possessed that authority: “he was of the Opinion the House had no right to delegate 
their Powers . . . to alter or change the Government.”138 
Generally speaking, then, leading Pennsylvania Quakers were distrustful of the 
popular resistance to British policy, and as the imperial crisis unfolded they used 
their control of the Assembly to buttress the existing political and social order.139 
To lead this effort, the Assembly selected “ultraconservative” Joseph Galloway as its 
Speaker.140 The Speaker had significant formal and informal power; he controlled 
the Assembly’s agenda, assigned members to the standing committees responsible
for drafting bills and investigating grievances, and generally acted “as the impartial 
guardian of the dignity and orderly action of the House.”141 Galloway identified the
Quaker party with the authority of the Assembly itself, thereby “confound[ing]
Pennsylvania’s political interests with the interests of its assemblymen.”142 Those
who opposed them were mere “mobs.”143 
In contrast to the Assembly, which was long dominated by the same figures, 
popular bodies like the Provincial Convention brought thousands of new men into
Pennsylvania government.144 Generally speaking, these new men were drawn to a
different politics. A significant number of those serving in popular bodies were rad-
icals and demonstrated a greater willingness to publicly criticize imperial govern-
ment and aggressively resist its policies.145 In this effort they sought to coordinate
with patriots in other colonies. Thus, for example, when the legislatures of Virginia,
Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Connecticut wrote to the Pennsylvania Assembly, 
requesting that it establish a committee devoted to “intercolonial communication
concerning the imperial crisis,” Speaker Galloway declined, referring the matter in-
stead to the Assembly’s standing committee of correspondence146 on which he
138 Votes and Proceedings of the House of Representatives of the Province of Pennsylvania, in
PENNSYLVANIA ARCHIVES, EIGHTH SERIES 5682 (Charles F. Hoban ed., 1935). Thanks to Julian 
Davis Mortenson for bringing this to my attention. 
139 See  JAMES H. HUTSON, PENNSYLVANIA POLITICS 1746–1770: THE MOVEMENT FOR
ROYAL GOVERNMENT AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 200–02 (1972) (describing the transformation of 
the Quaker party from a “country” party to a “court” party). There is also evidence of complex
and surprising political alliances. For example, the “White Oaks,” an association of Philadelphia 
shipwrights, largely workingmen, allied with the conservative Quakers and Benjamin Franklin,
opposing American resistance to the Stamp Act. James H. Hutson, An Investigation of the
Inarticulate: Philadelphia’s White Oaks, 28 WM.&MARY Q. 3, 20–23 (1971). 
140 RYERSON, supra note 130, at 15. 
141 LEONARD, supra note 126, at 16–21; see also RYERSON, supra note 130, at 15. 
142 RYERSON, supra note 130, at 17. 
143 On Quaker condemnation of “mobs,” see ANNE M. OUSTERHOUT, A STATE DIVIDED:
OPPOSITION IN PENNSYLVANIA TO THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 18 (1987). 
144 RYERSON, supra note 130, at 4–5; cf.  BREEN, supra note 121, at 173–74, 197–206
(describing this development in other colonies). 
145 RYERSON, supra note 130, at 45–52. 
146 Id. at 22. 
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served ex officio and whose majority were members of the Quaker party.147 Around
the same time, however, an informal meeting of Philadelphians established a popular
committee of correspondence, selecting (among others) several radicals as mem-
bers.148 When the Assembly’s standing committee then sought to temper messages
issued by the popular committee, they were chastised in a patriot newspaper by a
writer who desired to know by “whose authority did they act?”149 Apparently the
more representative, consultative and patriot-led popular committee could assert an 
exclusive jurisdiction over correspondence with other colonies relating to the cri-
sis.150 Even an Assembly committee could be outflanked by a popular, informal one,
if the legislature appeared diverted by factional interests.
Still, in the early stages of the conflict, the Assembly seems to have been the 
preferred organ for acting on Pennsylvanians’ grievances with imperial policy. The 
popular committee of correspondence chose the Anglican minister William Smith
to draft its message to Boston, and to the chagrin of the radicals, Smith cautioned
that his popular committee could not in fact speak for the people of Pennsylvania.151 
Even after it was decided that a Continental Congress would be held, members of a
subsequent popular committee agreed that “the most suitable agent for choosing
congressional delegates was the Pennsylvania Assembly, convened in formal ses-
sion.”152 Since “Governor Penn would not summon the Assembly,” however, an-
other agent was necessary.153 John Dickinson suggested a provincial convention be
used, but despite the need for some such body, others balked, expressing hope that
147 Id. at 263; LEONARD, supra note 126, at 27. 
148 RYERSON, supra note 130, at 40–42. 
149 Remarks on the Preceding Letter, in 1 AMERICAN ARCHIVES, supra note 115, at 486 n.* 
(“It does not appear by what authority these gentlemen have taken upon themselves to act as a
Committee of Correspondence for the Province on this affair. The papers give an account of a
more numerous Committee, composed of men of very different characters.”). 
150 See id. For membership of the Assembly’s standing Committee of Correspondence, see 
RYERSON, supra note 130, at 263 (“Members of the 1773–74 Assembly Session: Seniority and 
Standing Committee Assignments”). The mandate of the legislative committee related to
“communications with the Provincial Agent who resided in London in order to supervise
provincial affairs there.”). LEONARD, supra note 126, at 27. 
151 See Letter from the Committee of Philadelphia to the Committee of Boston, in 1 AMERICAN
ARCHIVES, supra note 115, at 341 (“[Y]ou are considered as suffering in the general cause. But 
what further advice to offer on this sad occasion, is a matter of the greatest difficulty, which not
only requires more mature deliberation, but also that we should take the necessary measures to
obtain the general sentiments of our fellow-inhabitants of this Province . . . .”); THAYER, supra
note 128, at 156. 
152 RYERSON, supra note 130, at 47; Charles Thomson Memorandum Book, 1754–1774, at 
159–62, https://digitallibrary.hsp.org/index.php/Detail/objects/14230. 
153 RYERSON, supra note 130, at 47. 
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a more legitimate method would be employed.154 The best method was for the As-
sembly to hear grievances.155 If there was a place for a convention, then, it was to
determine popular sentiment and then work in conjunction with the Assembly.
There was a “necessity of the closest union among ourselves [i.e., Pennsylvanians]
both in sentiment and action,” which a convention could provide better than a mal-
apportioned Assembly.156 Thus it was decided that a Convention would be elected, 
which could then instruct the Assembly about the views of Pennsylvanians on a 
proposed continental boycott.
The Assembly, soon called back into session by Governor Penn, never con-
sented to this subsidiary role for a Provincial Convention.157 When the Convention 
forwarded the Assembly a list of proposed delegates to the Continental Congress, 
along with instructions for the delegates, the Assembly ignored them, choosing its 
own slate of delegates (from among its members) and drafting its own instructions
for them.158 Writing under the pseudonym “A Freeman,” Speaker Galloway chal-
lenged the representative legitimacy of the Convention; its members, he wrote, had
been elected by popular county committees, “where, it is notorious, not one fourth
of the freeholders attend.”159 
Early conflict between the Assembly and the Provincial Convention affirmed 
two principles of the English constitutional order: first, that the Assembly was the 
constitutional means for the people of Pennsylvania to seek redress for their griev-
ances with government; and second, that the Assembly’s primacy in this respect
could be contested, and lawful bodies (such as legislative committees) supplanted by 
popular bodies. This contest was waged, at least in part, on representative creden-
tials. The Assembly’s malapportionment and corruption—its identification of the 
interests of Pennsylvanians with those of its Quaker representatives, who desired to 
154 As Ryerson puts it: 
Dickinson’s proposal encountered stiff opposition from several quarters. Opponents of the
plan all favored requesting Joseph Galloway to convene the Assembly unofficially to name 
Pennsylvania’s delegates [to the Continental Congress]. . . . [The various opponents] all fa-
vored cautious, traditional protests because their entire careers had taught them that any 
criticism of governmental authority must take the most legitimate form possible.
Id. at 48. 
155 Id. at 50. 
156 Circular Letter, PA. PACKET, July 4, 1774, at 3, reprinted in RYERSON, supra note 130, at
55. 
157 RYERSON, supra note 130, at 60; THAYER, supra note 128, at 158. 
158 RYERSON, supra note 130, at 61–62; THAYER, supra note 128, at 159–60. 
159 Paper Signed “a Freeman,” Handed About Among the Members of the House on the 21st,
Against the Appointment and Proceedings of the Convention, in 1 AMERICAN ARCHIVES, supra note 
115, at 608 (“The Committees are appointed at county meetings, where, it is notorious, not one 
fourth of the freeholders attend. The resolutions are previously drown up by some zealous 
partizan, perhaps by some fiery spirit, ambitiously solicitous of forcing himself into publick 
notice . . . .”).
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remain in power—worked to undermine its traditional authority. At the same time,
the practice of constructing popular provincial bodies from counties and religious 
congregations enhanced their legitimacy.160 
2. 1776: The Assembly and the Provincial Convention Struggle over the 
Independence Movement 
The contest between the Assembly and Convention over independence in early
1776 illustrates the same themes. Even at this late date, months after the outbreak 
of hostilities, there was little agreement about the relative authority of the Assembly
and Provincial Convention and in particular whether the Assembly might frame a 
state constitution. James Wilson described public opinion as divided. “Some said 
that the Assembly were adequate to the Purpose of adopting a new Government,” 
he wrote, while some maintained they could do so only after receiving “new Powers
from the People,” and others denied even this would suffice.161 
Propagandists directed their energies to showing that their preferred body was 
most representative of the people. The Assembly’s opponents emphasized that it was 
malapportioned and elected by a privileged few. “Do not mechanicks and farmers 
constitute ninety-nine out of a hundred people of America?” asked a writer. Why, 
then, should they “be excluded from having any share in the choice of their rulers, 
or forms of government”?162 Other critics accused representatives of pursuing their
own interests and the interests of imperial officials.163 Yet it was also possible to
charge popular committees with being unrepresentative of Pennsylvanians. Elec-
tions in February 1776 delivered control over the Philadelphia Committee of Ob-
servation to the “mechanics” faction, that is, city “craftsmen, shopkeepers, and petty
retailers,” whose politics were distinctively radical.164 Did they represent the people
of Pennsylvania?  
160 See ADAMS, supra note 100, at 27–28, 31. 
161 Letter of Hon. James Wilson to Gen. Horatio Gates, 1776, 36 PA. MAG. HIST. &
BIOGRAPHY 473, 474–75 (1912). 
162 Queries Addressed to the Writer Who Signs Himself Cato, PA. PACKET, Mar. 18, 1776, at
2. 
163 See, e.g., RYERSON, supra note 130, at 160, 169; Extracts from the Diary of Dr. James 
Clitherall, 1776, 22 PA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 468, 469 (1898) (“The Proprietary, John 
Penn, and most of the gentlemen of the city attached to his interest, were against [independence] 
lest the form of government should be changed, and they would no more acknowledge the old 
officers of the government.”); To the People, PA. PACKET, June 24, 1776, at 1 (describing the 
provincial “Tories and Crown Officers” opposed to independence and who “aim only to be
continued in office”). 
164 RYERSON, supra note 130, at 156–57, 184–85, 199–200; see also  HUTSON, supra note
139, at 230–31 (defining “mechanics” as those who “worked with their hands,” including some
“businessmen”).
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On May 15, 1776, the Second Continental Congress recommended that “As-
semblies and Conventions” in each colony form new state governments.165 Alt-
hough public opinion broke in favor of independence, Pennsylvanians could still
defend the Assembly’s authority to frame the new government. At a meeting of some
4,000 Philadelphians at the State House Yard on May 20, where various resolutions 
in favor of independence were loudly approved, only one failed to receive unani-
mous assent: “That the present House of Assembly was not elected for the purpose 
of forming a new government,” and that it could not form a government without 
“assuming arbitrary power.”166 At the same time, the meeting approved a “Protest”
that urged assemblymen not to form a new government, on grounds that the As-
sembly acted under the authority of “our mortal enemy, the King of Great-Britain” 
and that its members were “influenced, . . . either by Connexions with, or pecuniary 
Employments under” the Governor, who held his office by “the said King’s Com-
mission.”167 As such, the Assembly did not act with “the Authority of the People.”168 
The Assembly could represent the people, at least in principle, but this Assembly did 
not, since it was badly malapportioned and its members entangled with imperial
officials.169 If popular sovereignty was dynamic, it was corruption that drove it from
the Assembly’s hands. 
As the contest matured, radical Whigs in favor of independence settled on two 
lines of attack against anti-independence moderates and Tories in the Assembly.170 
They argued, first, that since the power to instruct delegates traditionally lay with
the people themselves, and not their representatives, the Assembly lacked authority
to instruct Pennsylvania’s delegates in the Continental Congress to oppose inde-
pendence.171 A popular convention was therefore necessary to determine proper in-
structions—a body radicals counted on controlling.172 Second, at the same time,
165 For the text of the May 15 Resolution and Preamble, see 4 JOURNALS OF THE 
CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 110, at 357–58. 
166 SELSAM, supra note 128, at 117. The lone dissenter was Isaac Gray. Id. at 177 n.86; see 
also EXTRACTS FROM THE DIARY OF CHRISTOPHER MARSHALL KEPT IN PHILADELPHIA AND 
LANCASTER DURING THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION, 1774–1781, at 72–73 (William Duane ed., 
Albany, Joel Musell 1877). 
167 Votes and Proceedings of the House of Representatives of the Province of Pennsylvania, in
PENNSYLVANIA ARCHIVES, supra note 138, at 7514–15 [hereinafter Votes and Proceedings of the
House]. Several petitions were submitted in response to the “Protest,” including an “Address and 
Remonstrance” signed by six thousand people, which attacked the “[a]llegations” in the Protest as 
baseless. SELSAM, supra note 128, at 122. 
168 Votes and Proceedings of the House, supra note 167, at 7515; SELSAM, supra note 128, at
118. 
169 Votes and Proceedings of the House, supra note 167, at 7515. 
170 RYERSON, supra note 130, at 158. 
171 See, e.g., To the Apologist, PA. EVENING POST, Mar. 5, 1776, at 2, reprinted in THAYER, 
supra note 128, at 178 (“The right of instructing lies with the constituents, and them only . . . .”).
172 THAYER, supra note 128, at 177–78. 
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radicals sought to gain control of the Assembly by pushing it to add seats in districts
they were likely to capture.173 If the Assembly were reapportioned, and radicals suc-
ceeded in capturing a majority, then the Assembly could instruct Pennsylvania’s 
continental delegates to favor independence. Of course, a more representative As-
sembly would also undercut one of the principle arguments in favor of a convention. 
Thus, when the Assembly agreed to add 17 seats in early March, it touched off a
heated debate about whether a Provincial Convention would still be necessary.
The most illustrative of the print exchanges on this topic involved “Cato,” “the 
Forester” and “Cassandra,” part of the “wordy war” over independence that gripped 
the Pennsylvania press in March and April of 1776.174 “Cato” was the Anglican
minister William Smith, who in 1774 had drafted the letter to Boston from the first
popular committee of correspondence.175 In that case he had merely cautioned that 
his committee did not represent Pennsylvanians, but he now went on the attack
against the tendency of these popular bodies to assert control of public affairs.176 
Committees, Cato wrote, were seeking to expand their authority by “prostituting 
the cry of publick necessity”—the standard justification, recall, for the mere con-
vention—in an effort “to cloak an ambition” of “a total destruction of our charter
Constitution” and an assumption of all the powers of government, “our whole do-
mestick police, with Legislative as well as Executive authority.”177 To this end the
committees openly attacked their own government, impugning “the majesty of the 
people of Pennsylvania . . . in the persons of their legal Representatives.”178 “Real
majesty,” of course, was the term George Lawson had used for the people’s sover-
eignty; but unlike Lawson, Cato located that sovereignty in the assembly, where the 
people were represented. Cato reminded his audience of the “great privilege” that 
the people of Pennsylvania enjoyed in that assembly, which was to “meet when they
173 Id. at 178. 
174 Id. at 178. Wood places this exchange at the center of his own account of the 
development of the convention. WOOD, supra note 19, at 333–35. 
175 RYERSON, supra note 130, at 167. 
176 Id. at 43. 
177 To the People of Pennsylvania.—Letter I, in 5 AMERICAN ARCHIVE, FOURTH SERIES 125 
(Peter Force ed., Washington, M. St. Clair Clarke & Peter Force 1844) [hereinafter Letter I, 5
AMERICAN ARCHIVES]; see also Queries Addressed to the Writer Who Signs Himself Cato, PA. PACKET, 
supra note, 162 at 2. On the issue of  the necessity of a convention, see To the People of 
Pennsylvania.—Letter III, in  5 AMERICAN ARCHIVE, supra, at 443 [hereinafter Letter III, 5
AMERICAN ARCHIVES]. 
178 Letter I, 5 AMERICAN ARCHIVES, supra note 177, at 125. 
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please, and sit as long as they judge necessary,” a “privilege . . . with which our pub-
lick business has been transacted” while other states’ assemblies were dissolved and
the people “driven into the measures of Conventions.”179 
Not only was there no real need—no necessity—to justify a convention, since 
the Assembly continued to meet, but the Assembly was a far preferable body for 
protecting liberty and property, since conventions were given to arbitrary proceed-
ings. “[D]oes any other Colony,” asked Cato, “whose Assemblies can exercise their 
authority, ever think of committing the conduct of affairs to Conventions?”180 Con-
ventions gave control over vital public decisions to a mere few; “does not the bare 
mention” of this fact, asked Cato, “further convince you that your liberties can no-
where be so safe as in the hands of your Representatives in Assembly?”181 Informal
bodies of men were likely, Cato suggested in another letter, to “frame oppressive 
laws for the sake of the power and wealth which they might derive to themselves by 
carrying such laws into execution.”182 In this way, bodies like conventions repro-
duced the faults of “Democracy or Republican Government” in which “[t]he spirit 
of one faction was suppressed only by that of a succeeding faction.”183 Their pro-
ceedings did not preserve the public peace or bring security to rights. Instead, they
threatened to corrupt the judgment of the people’s representatives in the Assem-
bly.184 
In short, the traditional justification for a convention was missing, while Penn-
sylvania’s popular committees had sought to govern arbitrarily and to promote pri-
vate, factional interests, rather than public interest and government under law. 
Neither “the Forester” (Thomas Paine) nor “Cassandra” (James Cannon, a 
leading radical) challenged Cato’s basic assumption that the Assembly enjoyed a 
prima facie right to frame Pennsylvania’s new government and that a Provincial 
Convention had to be justified either by necessity or by the corruption of the legis-
lature. The Forester thought these conditions plainly satisfied. “[I]f the body of the 
179 Id. at 126. 
180 Id.
181 Letter III, 5 AMERICAN ARCHIVES, supra note 177, at 444. 
182 To the People of Pennsylvania—Letter VII, in 5 AMERICAN ARCHIVES, supra note 177, at 
852. 
183 Id.
184 See Letter III, 5 AMERICAN ARCHIVES, supra note 177, at 443 (“[O]ur Assembly may now
be permitted to exercise their own judgment, without further attempts to intimidate
them . . . . [T]he chief resentment levelled against them, appears to be on account of their
instructions to their Delegates [to the Constitutional Convention, not to vote for independence].
These . . . stand as an insurmountable barrier in the way of their destructive purposes, and I trust 
will continue so to stand till removed by the clear sense of an uncorrupted majority of the good 
people of this Province.”). 
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people had thought,” he wrote, that “by sitting under the embarrassment of oaths,
and entangled with Government and Governors,” the Assembly “[is] not so perfectly 
free as [it] ought to be,” then they had “both the right and the power to place even
the whole authority of the Assembly in any body of men they please.”185 The As-
sembly was corrupted by the desire of its Quaker leadership to maintain their posi-
tion in the existing government and by the methods by which they administered 
this government. The people knew full well, he observed, that “bribery and corrup-
tion” were “the machine by which they [the government] effect all their plans.”186 
Paine’s characteristic verve was on full display. In these circumstances, there could
be no question that a Provincial Convention was the proper body to frame a new 
state constitution. “The Forester” made no mention of Henry Parker, but he might 
have, for Parker’s defense of parliamentary sovereignty had acknowledged that a 
convention of lords and commons could protect the people if the ministry had cor-
rupted the King.187 
Cassandra took up the defense of Pennsylvania’s popular bodies, which he 
thought immune to the corruption affecting the Assembly. The Provincial Conven-
tion had been elected by a broad segment of Pennsylvanians, freeing them from “the
channel of corruption” and making them the proper bodies to conduct the “publick 
business” and “secure the people from undue influence” by royal administrators.188 
Popular bodies acted in the public interest, while the Assembly did not. As everyone
knew, the Assembly could convene at its own discretion, but was there a “single 
measure that can be pursued”? The Assembly could not legislate without the Gov-
ernor’s assent, and by denying his consent the Governor had rendered the Assembly
powerless to protect the people’s rights. “[O]ur Legislatures are dependant on our
very enemy,” Cassandra wrote, while Parliament and King were independent of 
American assemblies, allowing Parliament to “enslave[]” Americans.189 Far from
protecting Pennsylvanians’ property, the “aristocratical junto” in the Assembly had 
joined in Parliament’s plan to “make the common and middle class of people their 
185 Letter I: To Cato, PA. GAZETTE, Apr. 3, 1776, at 1, reprinted in 5 AMERICAN ARCHIVES,
supra note 177, at 530 [hereinafter To Cato, 5 AMERICAN ARCHIVES]. 
186 To Cato, 5 AMERICAN ARCHIVES, supra note 185, at 531. 
187 PARKER, supra note 48, at 10. 
188 Cassandra to Cato, PA. PACKET, Mar. 25, 1776, at 1, reprinted in 5 AMERICAN ARCHIVES,
supra note 177, at 432. This was not an uncommon argument. See, e.g., Letter from the General 
Committee, at Charleston, S.C., to the New-York Committee (Mar. 1, 1775), in 2 AMERICAN
ARCHIVES, FOURTH SERIES 1, 3 (Peter Force ed., Washington, M. St. Clair Clark & Peter Force 
1839) (“[W]e find, that the larger this representation is, the less the danger of corruption and 
influence; the more is sly deceit deterred from venturing its efforts; and the more weight goes with
every determination.”). 
189 Cassandra to Cato II, in 5 AMERICAN ARCHIVES, supra note 177, at 923. 
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beasts of burden.”190 But Pennsylvania’s noble “freemen” refused “to be ridden by 
a King, Lords, and Commons.”191 
The Cato-Forester-Cassandra exchange clearly reproduced principal strands of
thought from writings about popular sovereignty in mid-seventeenth century Eng-
land. Precisely who gained the upper hand is difficult to say. When elections to the
Assembly’s new seats were held in early May, moderates prevailed in enough districts 
to preserve a two-vote majority for those opposed to independence.192 Frustrated
radicals shifted their strategy. They now focused their attack on voter qualification 
requirements, which they said had prevented the people from being heard.193 Even-
tually, pro-independence representatives stopped attending the Assembly, depriving 
it of a quorum.194 The Assembly, they argued, had abandoned the public at a time
of great danger to the people, and in these conditions a convention was necessary.
“Like James the Second,” wrote one radical, “they have abdicated the government, 
and by their own act of desertion and cowardice have laid the Provincial Conference
under the necessity of taking instant charge of affairs.”195 By the fall, the Assembly
had stopped meeting, and the Provincial Convention took up the tasks of framing
a constitution and governing the state.
The concern that members of the Assembly would act simply to perpetuate
themselves in power was, at bottom, a concern about self-dealing and corruption. If
entrusted with framing government, the Quaker leadership in the Assembly would 
require an uncommon virtue to establish a system that posed any risk to their con-
trol. “[M]ost men,” wrote Demophilus, “will sacrifice heaven and earth . . . to es-
tablish a power in themselves to tyrannize over the persons and properties of oth-
ers.”196 A convention was necessary to prevent this.
The primary worry of the radicals proposing a convention was self-dealing by 
the Quaker party and its allies, not the “new men” who filled the popular bodies
and Provincial Conventions. One risks misunderstanding radical writing about con-
ventions by abstracting from this political context. Yet pushed to its limit, these 
concerns could be detached from Pennsylvania politics and fashioned into a more 
general theory of conventions and fundamental law. One can detect this shift in a
pamphlet published around the time of a May 15 Congressional Resolution called 
190 Id. at 921. 
191 Id.
192 THAYER, supra note 128, at 179. 
193 Id.
194 Id. at 182. Conservatives would shortly employ the same strategy to undermine the 
government formed under the new state constitution several months later. 
195 To the People, PA. PACKET, supra note 163, at 2. 
196 DEMOPHILIUS, supra note 6, at 4 (quotation marks omitted). 
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The Alarm, which Gordon Wood treats as illustrative of a new American under-
standing of popular sovereignty.197 
The author of The Alarm began with a point not unlike one the Forester had 
made in March. The Assembly had no power to frame a constitution, he asserted,
since the authority it possessed derived from “the royal charter of our enemy,” which 
had authorized Pennsylvanians to convene a legislative assembly.198 During the im-
perial crisis, patriot writers had emphasized the royal basis of colonial charters as a
means of insulating them from parliamentary interference, drawing analogies to 
Magna Carta.199 The Alarm reversed this reasoning: Since the charters were issued
by the King’s prerogative, the Pennsylvania Assembly expressed his authority, rather 
than the people’s. Viewed in this perspective, the Assembly was merely an organ of 
imperial administration, and as imperial administrators (rather than delegates of the 
sovereign people), assemblymen could have “no more the power of suppressing the 
authority they sit by, than they have of creating it.”200 
A sense that the Assembly expressed the sovereignty of the people is missing
from The Alarm. This was not simply a point about the corrupt conduct of its lead-
ership. If the Assembly could frame a new government, the author reasoned, then
“every legislative body would have the power of suppressing a constitution at
will.”201 The very possibility of fundamental law seemed to require the use of a con-
vention to frame the state constitution. 
But even the author of The Alarm couldn’t fully separate himself from Penn-
sylvania’s unique politics. The dangers of self-dealing and corruption run through-
out the short pamphlet. “Were the present House of Assembly to be suffered by 
their own act to suppress the old authority derived from the Crown, they might
afterwards suppress the new authority received from the people,” leaving “the people 
at last no right at all.”202 Decades of oligarchic rule sensitized the radicals to the
prospect of a return of the elites and their entrenchment at the expense of the new 
men now leading the independence movement.203 The Alarm also rejected the sug-
gestion that the Assembly act as a convention, as some of its members now proposed,
197 See WOOD, supra note 19, at 337. 
198 THE ALARM:OR, AN ADDRESS TO THE PEOPLE OF PENNSYLVANIA, ON THE LATE RESOLVE 
OF CONGRESS, FOR TOTALLY SUPPRESSING ALL POWER AND AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM THE 
CROWN OF GREAT-BRITAIN 1 (May 1776) [hereinafter THE ALARM]. 
199 See Steilen, supra note 116, at 588–91. 
200 THE ALARM, supra note 198, at 1. 
201 Id.
202 Id.
203 See Douglas McNeil Arnold, Political Ideology and the Internal Revolution in 
Pennsylvania, 1776–1790, at 254–56 (1976) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton 
University). On the oligarchic rule of the Quaker party, see RYERSON, supra note 130, at 5.
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since “[t]he undue influence and partial connexions” which they had to royal gov-
ernment “render[ed] them unfit persons to be trusted with powers” to frame a gov-
ernment.204 
In this sense The Alarm was an ambiguous pamphlet. The proposition that
government was necessarily incompetent to frame its own fundamental law was pre-
sent, though it was not expounded at any length or decisively insisted on. Of appar-
ently equal importance was the argument that self-dealing and corruption rendered 
the Pennsylvania Assembly unfit to frame a constitution. The second principle— 
anti-corruption—goes nearly as far as the first. Yet it leaves open the possibility of
legislative framing of fundamental law. 
The victory of the radicals in Pennsylvania succeeded in bringing new men into
Pennsylvania government for the next 15 years.205 In late September, the Provincial
Convention adopted the new state constitution without submitting it to the people 
for ratification; it granted broad powers to a unicameral Assembly, but expressly
prohibited that body from altering the constitution.206 Radicals may have been seek-
ing to cement their gains against reactionary measures from the state’s disappointed 
moderates and conservatives who had now joined together in an “Anti-Constitu-
tionalist” or “Republican” party.207 Unlike constitutions in several other states,
Pennsylvania’s constitution did contain an express mechanism for formal amend-
ment. Every seven years the counties and cities were to elect men to a “council of 
censors,” which was “to enquire whether the constitution has been preserved invio-
late” and given the “power to call a convention” by two-thirds vote “if there appear
to them an absolute necessity of amending.”208 Despite this provision, however,
Pennsylvanians petitioned the legislature to call a convention, and three times be-
tween 1776 and 1790 it resolved to do so.209 In contrast, a report issued by the first 
Council of Censors in 1783 resulted in no changes to the constitution, though the 
204 THE ALARM, supra note 198, at 3. On the proposal that the Assembly itself hold a 
convention, see THAYER, supra note 128, at 182. 
205 THAYER, supra note 128, at 196. 
206 Id. at 192–97. 
207 Id. at 193; ROBERT L. BRUNHOUSE, THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION IN PENNSYLVANIA
1776–1790, at 27–38 (1942). 
208 PA. CONST. of 1776, § 47 (LLMC 2019). 
209 Traynor, supra note 5, at 51 & n.58; Harry L. Witte, Rights, Revolution, and the Paradox
of Constitutionalism: The Processes of Constitutional Change in Pennsylvania, 3 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 
383, 432–33 (1993). 
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council concluded the legislature had exceeded its powers.210 Finally, in 1789, the
legislature called a convention and it adopted a new state constitution.211 
Other states utilized a variety of procedures to amend their first state constitu-
tions. Delaware, Maryland, and South Carolina authorized the legislature to amend
their constitutions, although the first two states required multiple votes or a super-
majority and made some provisions unamendable entirely.212 Some states included 
no provision at all for amending their constitutions, though they generally included 
an implied reservation of rights to the people to alter government if it ceased to work 
for “the common benefit, protection and security, of the people.”213 A final group 
of state constitutions included provisions for calling a convention, just as the Penn-
sylvania Constitution of 1776 did.214 
IV. AMENDING THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION: THE ROLE OF THE 
CONVENTION IN ARTICLE V 
We have now largely completed our study of the development of the constitu-
tional convention in seventeenth-century England and late eighteenth-century 
America. Our attention has been directed at a particular strand of thinking about
the authority of the convention and its relationship to government; according to 
this thinking, government may represent the people in their sovereign capacity, but 
when government is corrupt or there is a serious danger that those in power will act
primarily to continue themselves in power, the people may use a popular convention 
to alter government so as to secure their property and liberty from arbitrary depri-
vation. And while the correlation of theory to practice is generally imperfect, the 
periods under study do evidence political struggles waged in just these terms. Poli-
210 See THE PROCEEDINGS RELATIVE TO CALLING THE CONVENTIONS OF 1776 AND 1790,
at 83–113 (Harrisburg, John S. Wiestling 1825); Edward S. Corwin, The Progress of Constitutional
Theory Between the Declaration of Independence and the Meeting of the Philadelphia Convention, 30 
AM. HIST. REV. 511, 519–20 (1925). 
211 See BRUNHOUSE, supra note 207, at 221–27. 
212 DE. CONST. of 1776, art. 30 (LLMC 2019) (“No other Part of this Constitution shall be 
altered, changed or diminished without the Consent of five Parts in seven of the Assembly and 
seven Members of the Legislative Council.”); MD.CONST. of 1776, art. LIX (LLMC 2019) (“That 
this Form of Government, and the Declaration of Rights, and no part thereof, shall be altered, 
changed, or abolished, unless a bill . . . shall pass the General Assembly, and be published at least
three months before a new election, and shall be confirmed by the General Assembly, after a new
election of Delegates . . . .”).
213 VA. CONST. of 1776, DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, § 3, 1 Va. Stat. 47 (1823). 
214 DODD, supra note 100, at 26–29; Traynor, supra note 5, at 61–62; see also John Dinan, 
“The Earth Belongs Always to the Living Generation”: The Development of State Constitutional
Amendment and Revision Procedures, 62 REV. POL. 645, 651 (2000). 
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ticians compete with one another by claiming to act on behalf of the people—in-
cluding by altering fundamental law. This competition gives a dynamic quality to
popular sovereignty.
In this Part, I want to use this framework to examine the place of the conven-
tion in the Federal Constitution, and in particular Article V. Men leading the move-
ment for a stronger federal government saw it as a means of controlling the work of
factions in state legislatures.215 Factions, as Madison defined them, promoted the
private interests of a particular group rather than the common good; their domina-
tion of the legislature and use of its powers to advance their interests is what we have 
been calling “corruption.”216 Since corruption was a problem in the state legisla-
tures, we would expect the men seeking to strengthen the federal government to 
make use of a different body, one resistant to the corruption affecting the state leg-
islatures. 
The Articles of Confederation, the instrument under which the then existing 
Confederation Congress derived its powers, could only be amended by legislatures. 
Article XIII stipulated that no “alteration” should be made unless agreed to in Con-
gress and “afterwards confirmed” by every state legislature.217 Repeated efforts to
amend the Articles under this provision were frustrated. In 1782, for example, while 
the war was still ongoing, Rhode Island defeated Robert Morris’s drive to give Con-
gress the power to levy an impost; its state politics were dominated by “a fiery agrar-
ian democrat, David Howell,” who opposed the measure.218 In response, New York
called for a convention; but in 1786, when Rhode Island finally came around, New 
York was flush with tax revenue and decided to kill the national impost itself.219 A 
perception that state legislatures were impeding amendments that would serve the 
national interest led to calls for conventions. Between 1782 and 1786 a number of 
states asked Congress to call a convention to consider amendments or called for one 
themselves, despite the fact that the Articles made no provision for such an institu-
tion.220 Still, there were doubts about the form such a body would assume. Speaking
215 See, e.g., James Madison, Vices of the Political System of the United States, April 1787, 
FOUNDERS ONLINE, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-09-02-0187 (last
visited Feb. 3, 2020). For a leading interpretation of Vices, and of the larger movement for a federal
government that focuses on faction in state legislatures, see JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL 
MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 28–34 (1996). 
216 Madison, supra note 215. 
217 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. XIII. 
218 RICHARD BEEMAN, PLAIN, HONEST MEN: THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 12 (2009); see also KYVIG, supra note 26, at 38; RAKOVE, supra note 215, at 25. 
219 BEEMAN, supra note 218, at 15; MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, THE FRAMER’S COUP: THE 
MAKING OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 24–32 (2016). 
220 See, e.g., 25 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774–1789, at 951–52
(Gaillard Hunt ed., 1922); Stasny, supra note 9, at 76–77. 
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in Congress, Madison and Alexander Hamilton opposed calling “partial conven-
tions,” which excluded some states, on grounds that it would encourage the for-
mation of state blocs in national politics.221 
At the Philadelphia Convention as well, as delegates thought through how they
would seek popular authorization for the radical plan of government they were 
forming in secret, there was no clear preference for using popular bodies rather than
legislatures. Notably, not a single delegate seconded Governor Morris’s suggestion
that the proposed Constitution be submitted to a national convention for ratifica-
tion.222 The proposal would have to be submitted to state bodies of some kind.
Delegates were divided over whether those bodies should be state legislatures or state 
conventions.223 Ultimately, the decision to employ state conventions was driven by
a concern that legislatures would be attacked as incompetent to amend their state
constitutions, which would be impliedly amended by the adoption of a superior
Federal Constitution.224 Since state legislatures would be limiting their own power 
by ratifying the creation of a superior, national legislature, Federalists sitting in the
state legislatures would leave themselves open to charges of self-dealing and to con-
comitant arguments that the legislature did not act on behalf of the people. To lessen
this risk, Article VII provided for the submission of the proposed Constitution to 
state conventions.225 
The proposed Constitution also included an express mechanism for its own 
Amendment, namely, Article V. In considering why Article V empowers both leg-
islatures and conventions to amend the Constitution, it is essential to keep in mind
that the ground was shifted by the creation of the national legislature, Congress.
Madison saw Congress in particular as alleviating the harms of corruption in the 
state legislatures, and its design reflected, in numerous ways, the anti-corruption
principle.226 If Congress succeeded in having this effect, then both it and state leg-
islatures might be employed to amend the Federal Constitution. Madison conse-
quently saw no need for a national framing convention at all, and believed a Con-
gress full of public-minded statesmen should be the only deliberative body to 
propose amendments. A national convention was an uncertain thing, lacking any 
221 See 25 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774–1789, at 952 (Gaillard Hunt
ed., 1922). 
222 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERALCONVENTION OF 1787, at 93 (Max Farrand ed., 1911)
[hereinafter RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION].
223 See id.
224 See  RAKOVE, supra note 215, at 103–06; Akhil Reed Amar, Philadelphia Revisited:
Amending the Constitution Outside of Article V, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1043, 1049 (1988). 
225 U.S. CONST. art. VII (“The Ratification of the Conventions of nine States, shall be 
sufficient for the Establishment of this Constitution between the States so ratifying the Same.”). 
226 See  RAKOVE, supra note 215, at 47–56; Teachout, supra note 17, at 348 (discussing
Madison’s view that the Philadelphia Convention was necessitated by “corruption in the legislative 
councils”). 
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careful institutional design and (although he did not say this) the weight that an 
august, national legislative assembly like his new Congress would have. A badly 
drawn convention might introduce faction and corruption. If a national convention 
were to be used, it would presumably have to be regulated by Congress to ensure
that it employed the kind of public deliberation that conferred legitimacy on gov-
ernment.227 
A. The Philadelphia Convention and the Framing of Article V 
It is well known that contemporaries regarded the difficulty of amending the
Articles of Confederation as one of its chief defects.228 When Congress called for a 
convention to be held at Philadelphia in the summer of 1787, “for the sole and
express purpose of revising the Articles,” its resolution began by citing the unanimity
requirement in Article XIII.229 From today’s perspective, one expects to learn that
the plans proffered at Philadelphia all included amendment provisions more liberal 
than the Articles, but this was not in fact the case. Of the two plans traditionally
most studied, the Virginia Plan introduced by Edmund Randolph and the New 
Jersey plan introduced by William Paterson, only the former included an amend-
ment provision at all, and it was aspirational, suggesting rather meekly that “provi-
sion ought to be made for the amendment of the Articles of the Union whensoever 
it shall seem necessary,” even without the assent of the national legislature.230 When
this resolution came up for discussion in the convention’s Committee of the Whole,
several delegates expressed doubt that it was necessary.231 The several state constitu-
tions that omitted amendment procedures, including the Virginia Constitution it-
self, had not proved defective in this regard; the problem was including a procedure 
that proved impossible to execute, as had the Articles, with the effect of frustrating
change altogether.232 An amendment procedure required careful design. 
What of the other plans of government aired at the convention? Charles Pinck-
ney presented a plan on May 29th; in Max Farrand’s reconstructed version, the
227 On Madison’s view that public opinion conferred legitimacy on republican government, 
see COLLEENA. SHEEHAN, JAMESMADISON AND THE SPIRIT OF REPUBLICAN SELF-GOVERNMENT
80–83 (2009). 
228 BEEMAN, supra note 218, at 9; KLARMAN, supra note 219 at 25; see also RAKOVE, supra
note 215, at 25–28. 
229 32 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774–1789, at 73–74 (Roscoe R. Hill
ed., 1936). 
230 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 222, at 22 (Madison). As the 
New Jersey Plan was framed as an amendment to the Articles, it left Article XIII in effect. Id. at 
243–45. 
231 Id. at 121, 202. 
232 Jefferson concluded that the Virginia legislature could change the state’s constitution, 
and thus Virginia’s constitution, though it contained no formal amendment procedure, might be
read to have impliedly allowed for legislative amendment. JEFFERSON, supra note 7, at 121–23. 
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Pinckney plan mandated that its terms be “inviolably observed unless altered as be-
fore directed,” apparently referring to a prior clause requiring the assent of an as-
yet-undetermined number of states to “invest future additional powers” in Con-
gress.233 On June 18th, Alexander Hamilton described a plan of government to the
delegates and apparently omitted mention of an amendment mechanism.234 A text 
Hamilton provided to Madison at the close of the convention, illustrating “the Con-
stitution which he would have wished to be proposed by the Convention,” did con-
tain a provision for amendment, but it was nearly identical to Article V and likely
added as an afterthought; by mid-June, when Hamilton actually presented his plan,
amendment was not yet a hotly disputed topic.235 Thus, even if there was wide-
spread agreement at the opening of the Philadelphia Convention that amending a 
constitution should require less than unanimous consent, there was apparently no 
sense that this necessitated an express provision in the text or what such a provision
should look like.236 
Article V really began to take shape only with the work of the Committee of
Detail, which convened in late July. Just as it did with other resolutions in the Vir-
ginia Plan, this committee transformed general language (e.g., “the constitution
should be amended whenever necessary”) into a specific and narrower institutional
form.237 William Ewald has recently reaffirmed Farrand’s conclusion that the com-
mittee’s amendment provision appears first in John Rutledge’s handwriting, as an 
annotation to a draft prepared by Edmund Randolph.238 Rutledge’s proposal pro-
vided that upon application by two-thirds of the state legislatures, the national leg-
islature would “call a Convn. to revise or alter ye Articles of Union.”239 Subsequent
233 3 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 222, at 609. The prior clause 
read, “The assent of the Legislature of . . . States shall be sufficient to invest future additional powers 
in U. S. in C. ass. and shall bind the whole confederacy.” Id. There is some uncertainty about 
Pinckney’s plan. In 1818, Pinckney mailed John Quincy Adams drafts of what he believed was 
the plan he presented at the opening of the Convention, although Farrand doubts this could have 
been that text. Id. at 595, 601–04. The 1818 draft contains language very close to Article V. See 
id. at 601. 
234 See 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 222, at 281–311; Variant 
Texts of the Plan Presented by Alexander Hamilton to the Federal Convention, THE AVALON 
PROJECT, YALE LAW SCHOOL (2008) http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/hamtexta.asp. 
235 3 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 222, at 617–19 (emphasis 
added).
236 Postponing the part of the resolution obviating the assent of the national legislature, the 
Virginia plan’s resolution calling for an amendment provision passed without dissent on July 23, 
1787. 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 222, at 87. 
237 William Ewald, The Committee of Detail, 28 CONST. COMMENT. 197, 210 (2012). 
238 Id. at 220, 237, 250 n.140. 
239 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 222, at 148. 



























452020] CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 
drafts in James Wilson’s handwriting preserved this basic structure, which was re-
ported to the full convention as Article XIX of the committee’s draft.240 
When the Committee of the Whole turned its attention to this proposal, it
seemed to reawaken conflicts between proponents of national power and local power 
that had dominated the first phase of the convention.241 Now, concern was ex-
pressed that allied states would form blocs and use the amendment process to force 
changes in the national constitution that effectively nullified provisions in other 
state constitutions. Thus, “Grumbletonian” Elbridge Gerry, who earlier had favored
including an amendment procedure, now worried aloud that the proposed mecha-
nism might be used to “subvert the State-Constitutions altogether.”242 Historian 
Richard Beeman has remarked that Gerry’s objection made little sense, but if one 
assumes a convention would be free, or even just inclined, to reject constraints im-
posed on it by state legislatures, the worry is indeed understandable.243 There would 
be no opportunity for states to defeat an amendment in ratification.
These kinds of concerns, which resurfaced several times as the convention ad-
vanced, led Madison to propose splitting the amendment process into two phases:
a proposal phase and a ratification phase.244 State bodies—legislatures or conven-
tions—would be exclusively used during the ratification phase, and the assent of
three-fourths of those bodies would be required to give an amendment legal effect. 
This provided increased protection for states. At the same time, Madison moved 
that “the legislature of the U – S –” be given the power to propose amendments.245 
Although the point was not included in his notes, requiring a supermajority vote in 
a House whose apportionment reflected slave populations and in an equally appor-
tioned Senate would further protect state interests. Nonetheless, Rutledge immedi-
ately objected that he could not support “a power by which the articles relating to
slaves might be altered by the States not interested in that property and prejudiced
against it.”246 The objection is hard to understand, given that Madison’s two-stage
procedure was more protective of states than the one Rutledge himself had penned 
while on the Committee of Detail.247 He asked to amend Madison’s proposal to
immunize from amendment the Slave Trade and Direct Taxes Clauses of Article I,
240 Id. at 174, 188; Paul J. Scheips, The Significance and Adoption of Article V of the 
Constitution, 26 NOTRE DAME LAW. 46, 53 (1950). 
241 See, e.g., RAKOVE, supra note 215, at 70–83. 
242 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 222, at 122 (Gerry favors); 2 
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 222, at 557–58 (Gerry opposes and voices
objection); TAYLOR, supra note 37, at 376 (“Grumbletonian”).
243 BEEMAN, supra note 218, at 338. 
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both of which protected slavery.248 The amended motion passed, nine states in fa-
vor, with only Delaware opposed and New Hampshire divided.249 Thus Congress’s
power to propose amendments passed into the text alongside one of the Constitu-
tion’s express protections of slavery.250 
Late in the convention, George Mason objected to Congress possessing the sole 
power to propose amendments, reasoning that an “oppressive” Congress might frus-
trate the process entirely even if the people supported it. Elbridge Gerry moved to
add to a second proposal mechanism, namely, a national convention called at the
request of two-thirds of the states. This would return a national convention to the
text. Madison worried aloud that a national convention would raise difficult ques-
tions about procedure and form, alluding to familiar worries about irregular pro-
ceedings in informal popular bodies—and perhaps to unspoken worries about the 
membership of those bodies as well. Nevertheless, Gerry’s motion carried without 
opposition, and Article V assumed its final form.251 
Gerald Gunther has characterized the framing of Article V as a struggle between
advocates of nationalism and localism.252 Today we would want to emphasize more
than Gunther the relationship between localism and slavery. What is missing, how-
ever, on either account, is any concern with using conventions to give amendments 
popular authority. Two sorts of conventions are in Article V: state conventions and 
the national convention. Neither was added to invest an amendment with popular
authority. State conventions were added to protect state constitutions from abroga-
tion by amendments to the national Constitution. Since state legislatures were also
competent for this purpose, however, they were included as well.253 The national
convention had been initially proposed as a framing and enacting body for amend-
ments but was stripped of this function by the addition of state ratifying bodies. Its 
248 On the connection between the Direct Taxes Clause and slavery, see Bruce Ackerman,
Taxation and the Constitution, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 10 (1999). 
249 Id.
250 Advocates of local power continued to object to the amendment mechanism, which led
to the additional immunization for Senate apportionment. 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION , supra note 222, at 630–31; JOHN R. VILE, THE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDING
PROCESS IN AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT 30–31 (1992); Scheips, supra note 240, at 57–59. 
251 Id. at 559, 629–30. 
252 Gerald Gunther, The Convention Method of Amending the United States Constitution, 14
GA. L. REV. 1, 14 (1979). On June 11, Mason had expressed support for the amendment
resolution in the Virginia Plan, including its exclusion of national legislative consent, since “they
may abuse their power.” 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 222, at 203. He 
objected to Madison’s proposed amendment of the Committee of Detail proposal on similar
grounds. 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 222, at 629. 
253 Charles Pinckney observed of Article V and the procedure in his own plan, which
provided for amendment by agreement of a certain number of state legislatures, that “[t]he
principles” of the two systems “are precisely the same.” He made no mention of the presence of
conventions in Article V. 3 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 222, at 120. 
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role in the final form of Article V was to provide a means for proposing amendments 
if Congress became “oppressive” or stymied popular calls for change—a role we have 
seen ascribed to conventions throughout this Article. In this final form, then, the 
national convention did not function to convey the sovereign authority of the peo-
ple. In sum, the debate conveys no sense that conventions were added to Article V 
to ensure that amendments enjoyed the status of fundamental law. A supermajority
of legislatures could confer this status just as well.
The convention’s deliberations also reflect a view that legislatures enjoyed cer-
tain advantages over conventions as amending bodies. Legislatures were more formal
in their proceedings, had limited powers, and were more likely to be filled by gen-
tlemen, even if state legislatures in recent years did have too many of the “new men.”
Madison, for one, hoped the national legislature would address some of these de-
fects. For a group of men concerned with maintaining peace and order and preserv-
ing their place in government, it was sensible to provide for constitutional change 
in institutions whose formal proceedings they could expect to direct.
B. Ratification 
Ratification transformed the debate over amendment that occurred in Phila-
delphia, nearly inverting it. In states where Anti-Federalists succeeded in being
elected in large numbers to the state convention, men used the floor to air a some-
what different set of concerns than had been voiced at Philadelphia.254 Rather than
worry that Article V would permit a group of allied states to nullify the constitution
of a different state, Anti-Federalists focused on how difficult it would be to amend 
the national Constitution.255 Thus Patrick Henry complained in his opening re-
marks at the Virginia Ratifying Convention that “[t]he way to amendment is in my
conception, shut.”256 The problem was that three-fourths of the states “must ulti-
mately agree to any amendments”; the opportunities for “unworthy characters” to 
prevent the adoption or even proposal of amendments limiting their own power was 
therefore great. Henry’s speech was acknowledged to be nearly impossible to tran-
scribe, and the recorder in the Virginia Convention could only sit near the door,
254 This is true of Virginia, which I examine below. See also LORRI GLOVER, THE FATE OF
THE REVOLUTION: VIRGINIANS DEBATE THE CONSTITUTION 90–92 (2016). 
255 Sanford Levinson, “Veneration” and Constitutional Change: James Madison Confronts the 
Possibility of Constitutional Amendment, 21 TEX. TECHL. REV. 2443, 2447 (1990); see also Federal 
Farmer, No. 4, 12 Oct. 1787, in 4 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 579 (Philip B. Kurland & 
Ralph Lerner eds., 1987). 
256 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERALCONSTITUTION 76 (Jonathan Elliot ed., Washington 1836) [hereinafter THE DEBATES]. 
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where it was difficult to hear.257 But even so he caught a bit of Henry’s characteristic
bluster: “To suppose that so large a number as three-fourths of the states will concur, 
is to suppose that they will possess genius, intelligence and integrity, approaching to
miraculous.”258 Giving control of amendment to “one tenth part of the population”
was antidemocratic.259 
The requirement of unanimous consent for amendment of the Articles of Con-
federation left Federalists with a natural rejoinder: The present system was even 
more anti-democratic. Madison expressed disbelief that Henry could protest the
difficulty of amending the Constitution when “the thirteenth article of the confed-
eration expressly require[s] that no alteration shall be made without the unanimous 
consent of all the states.”260 If it was antidemocratic to let one-quarter of the states
block an amendment, nothing was “more perniciously improvident and injudicious, 
than [the Articles’] submission of the will of the majority to the most trifling mi-
nority.”261 Just to refresh his audience, Madison adduced the example of “the petty
state of Rhode Island,” a “little state” that had blocked necessary improvements in
the Articles, at great cost and danger to Virginia and the union during a time of 
war.262 Henry knew well the difficulty created by Congress’s reliance on state req-
uisitions; he had served as Virginia’s first governor and struggled to supply the 
needed troops and supplies.263 In fairness to Henry, his point was probably different:
that if there were to be a true national legislature with a power of taxation, demo-
cratic principles demanded an easier method of amendment than Article V pro-
posed. Nevertheless, Madison had landed his punch; Federalists in other conven-
tions made the point as well.264 
Federalist elites adduced Article V in acknowledgement of the need for amend-
ment, thus undercutting Anti-Federalist demands for changes before ratification.265 
257 On the transcription of the debates, and on using these legislative records generally, see 
MARY SARAH BILDER, MADISON’S HAND: REVISING THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 167
(2015). 
258 3 THE DEBATES, supra note 256, at 77. 
259 Id. The anti-democratic quality of the proposed Federal Constitution was noted by a 
number of Anti-Federalist writers. See, e.g., Levinson, supra note 255, at 2447 (“[W]e shall
perceive that the general government, in this part [i.e., the executive], will have a strong tendency
to aristocracy, or the government of the few.”). 
260 3 THE DEBATES, supra note 256, at 110. 
261 Id.
262 Id.
263 RICHARD R. BEEMAN, PATRICK HENRY: A BIOGRAPHY 111 (New York, McGraw-Hill 
1974). 
264 See, e.g., 2 THE DEBATES, supra note 256, at 197. 
265 On the Anti-Federalist demand for “previous” or “conditional” amendments in Virginia,
see GLOVER, supra note 254, at 41, 48–49. For a Federalist argument that Article V would permit
subsequent amendments, see, e.g., 2 THE DEBATES, supra note 256, at 116 (Rufus King). 
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In Number 43 of The Federalist, published several months before the Virginia Rat-
ifying Convention, Publius (Madison) observed in measured tones that “useful al-
terations will be suggested by experience.”266 Edmund Pendleton, presiding at the
Virginia Convention, agreed that, using Article V, “errors which shall have been 
experienced” could be removed.267 The men of the bar and bench would have found
the argument familiar; writers had long claimed the wisdom of experience as a great
advantage of the common law.268 Speakers paired praise of incremental, experi-
enced-based change with a reminder of the alternative. In the Massachusetts Con-
vention, Charles Jarvis observed that a constitutional method of amendment would
lessen the likelihood of revolutionary change and “blood” (a point that was also
often made about judicial review).269 Jarvis’s point touched on what was a deep fear
among Federalists of violent, radical constitutional change, a phenomenon they 
seemed to connect to the importance of “firm government” and the execution of 
law.270 Thus, in the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention, James Iredell praised the
Constitution for including a “regular[]” method of amendment so that recourse to
“civil war” would be unnecessary.271 At the same time, the method did not permit
the constitution to be amended “quite so easily, which would be extremely impoli-
tic.”272 Although it allowed for change, Publius said, the proposed Constitution
“guards equally against that extreme facility, which would render the Constitution
too mutable.”273 The procedure in Article V had been calibrated so as to avoid both
extremes—impossibility of change and ease of change—both of which posed serious
risks. In short, said Pendleton, it was “an easy and quiet method of reforming what 
may be found amiss,” so that if the people’s agents in government acted corruptly,
“from motives of self-interest,” the people could “assemble in convention” and
“punish those servants, who have perverted powers designed for our happiness, to
their own emolument.”274 If government became corrupt, the convention was avail-
able, just as it had been in the past, but now legalized and incorporated into a de-
fined procedure, reducing the risk of serious disorder and violence. 
266 THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, at 315–17 (James Madison). 
267 3 THE DEBATES, supra note 256, at 291. 
268 See  GERALD POSTEMA, BENTHAM AND THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 63–65 (1989) 
(describing the view that the common law contained the “[w]isdom of the ages”). 
269 2 THE DEBATES, supra note 256, at 130 (Jarvis). George Mason had made the same point
at the Philadelphia Convention. 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 222, at
203. Delegates made precisely the same point in favor of judicial review—that it would avoid 
violent conflict over the structure of government. Steilen, supra note 116, at 521 (describing an 
argument in the Virginia Convention by John Marshall). 
270 Levinson, supra note 255, at 2450. 
271 4 THE DEBATES, supra note 256, at 182. 
272 Id.
273 THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, at 315 (James Madison) (emphasis added). 
274 3 THE DEBATES, supra note 256, at 66. 
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Beyond this, there was little extended discussion of Article V. There was no 
effort to engage with the tradition of political writing on legal change, including by
Locke, Machiavelli, the English jurist Matthew Hale, and Montesquieu—authors
with whom the founding generation was familiar.275 Nor did men consider alterna-
tive amendment procedures. The major exception is Number 49 of The Federalist, 
in which Publius describes a method of amendment proposed by Thomas Jefferson 
in Notes on the State of Virginia. 276 Jefferson’s proposal provided that “two of the
three branches of government” could call a convention “for altering this constitu-
tion, or correcting breaches of it.”277 Publius, assuming that the method would re-
sult in “frequent appeals,” objects that it “would carry an implication of some defect 
in the government [and] in a great measure, deprive the government of that vener-
ation which time bestows” and which history shows necessary for “stability.”278 Tell-
ingly, however, the “greatest objection” Publius has to Jefferson’s proposal is that
legislators would win election to the convention and bring party politics with them,
ensuring that amendment would never “turn on the true merits of the question.”279 
The objection clearly also applies to national conventions of the kind men-
tioned in Article V, since national conventions would also lack the protections 
against party politics that Madison believed Congress possessed. It would seem, 
then, that despite the parallel treatment of convention and Congress in the text of 
Article V, Madison continued to assume that amendments would normally be pro-
posed by Congress. He must have regarded national conventions just as George
Mason had described them: necessary for when Congress became oppressive and 
prevented amendment. They were, in short, a stop-gap. The primary institution for
proposing amendments would be an august national legislature. 
CONCLUSION: THE FALL—AND RISE—OF THE CONVENTION IN 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT 
Much more could be said about the convention in America, but here’s the work 
I think we have completed. We have reexamined political writings dating from the
infancy of the constitutional convention and identified a series of these writings that 
treat popular sovereignty as dynamic. From the beginning of a doctrine of popular
sovereignty in English political and legal thought, multiple political bodies were 
competing for the authority that flowed from representing the people in their sov-
ereign capacity. Politicians used a variety of arguments to that end, but if there was 
275 See VILE, supra note 250, at 2–17. 
276 JEFFERSON, supra note 7, at 221–22. Notes was first completed after Jefferson’s term as 
Governor of Virginia, sometime in 1781. 
277 Id. at 304. 
278 THE FEDERALIST NO. 49, at 349 (James Madison). This is Levinson’s point. Levinson,
supra note 255, at 2450–54. 
279 THE FEDERALIST NO. 49, at 350–51 (James Madison). 
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a master argument, it was that other bodies acted to promote the private interests of
persons in power, rather than public interest. In a word, they were corrupt. 
Looking forward from the end of this study, at the turn of the nineteenth cen-
tury, gives the impression of a fork in the road. Historians of state constitutions 
report the increased use of conventions in the nineteenth century to “bypass en-
trenched legislative interests”280—a form of corruption for which they had been
used in the eighteenth century, as we have seen. But some of the same problems 
emerged within conventions themselves. According to historian Morton Keller,
“none of these gatherings may be said to have resolved the issues that confronted 
them,” and by the late-nineteenth century, special interests had seized control of 
state conventions.281 Over the long run, some states shifted the process of amend-
ment away from conventions, which were dominated by factions and special inter-
ests, toward legislatures, voter initiatives and referenda, and non-partisan commis-
sions. Thus, legislatures came to dominate the amendment of state constitutions. 
More generally, governmental change of both state and federal constitutional law 
has become a familiar practice.  
At the same time, even if the use of constitutional conventions ultimately de-
clined, their place in our constitutional thinking has remained firm. From the period 
of ratification, Federalists used the constitutional convention as a means to establish 
the supremacy of the national government over the states.282 As part of this effort,
Federalists insisted on the presence of the people in the ratifying conventions and 
their absence from all branches of government, which might compete with conven-
tions and thus impugn the authority of the Federal Constitution. The canonization
of Chief Justice John Marshall’s opinions in the early twentieth century cemented
this understanding of the convention for many generations of American lawyers. By 
reaffirming this exclusive jurisdiction for the convention, lawyers also placed express
textual changes to the Constitution practically out of reach, thereby enhancing the 
control of courts of law, the executive and the administration over constitutional
change, in which lawyers play key roles. 
This, I suspect, is the origin of the orthodox theory of the constitutional con-
vention. The revisionist theory, in contrast, situates the convention alongside a 
range of governmental bodies, all of which can compete for an authority to alter
fundamental law. None of this implies a rejection of popular sovereignty. It implies 
what even the most casual observation of our politics reveals: that politicians com-
pete for authority by claiming to represent the people and that on this basis go about 
using their powers to make changes to our fundamental law.
280 Dinan, supra note 214, at 659, 662–63, 673. 
281 Morton Keller, The Politics of State Constitutional Revision, 1820–1830, in  THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION AS AN AMENDINGDEVICE 67, 70–73 (Hall et al. eds., 1981). 
282 See, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 403–04 (1819). 
